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Modernizing Security in Rents: The New
Uniform Assignment of Rents Act
R. Wilson Freyermuth*
INTRODUCTION

Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, the creation, perfection, and enforcement of a security interest in the rents of personal property
collateral is simple stuff. A security interest in personal property automatically extends to identifiable proceeds of that property, unless the security
agreement provides otherwise.' Article 9 defines "proceeds" to include whatever is received upon "disposition" of the collateral, and explicitly recognizes
that a "lease" of the collateral is a "disposition" - i.e., Article 9 treats "rents"
received from the leasing of personal property collateral as "proceeds" of that
collateral.2 The treatment of personal property rents as "proceeds" reflects the
presumed intention of lender and borrower that the lender's security interest
should extend to sums - such as rents - that reflect a return upon the economic value of the collateral . As a result, a security interest in personal

* John D. Lawson Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. The
author served as the Reporter to the Drafting Committee of the Uniform Assignment
of Rents Act. The author gratefully thanks the following persons whose generous
contributions supported the research for this article: the Uniform Law Foundation, the
Armstrong Teasdale Faculty Research Fellowship, the Thompson Cobum Faculty
Development Fund, Mr. Edgar Mayfield, Ms. Linda S. Legg, and the late Lawrence
G. Crahan. The author also expresses warm thanks to the following persons who have
provided comments on this article and/or the Uniform Assignment of Rents Act, or
whose previous work has contributed to the thoughts expressed in this article: Terry
Care, Lani Ewart, Julie Forrester, Carl Fridy, Michael Getty, Tom Grimshaw, Barry
Hawkins, Bill Henning, Ted Kramer, Ed Lowry, Fred Miller, Roger Morgan, Jack
Murray, Grant Nelson, Pat Randolph, Ed Smith, Jeff Smith, Joshua Stein, Ira
Waldman, Erica Weiss, Norma Williams, L.H. Wilson, and Dale Whitman.
1. U.C.C. §§ 9-315(a)(2), 9-203(0 (2001).
2. Id. § 9-102(a)(64)(A).
3. See R. Wilson Freyermuth, Rethinking Proceeds: The History, Misinterpretation and Revision of U.C.C. Section 9-306, 69 TUL. L. REv. 645, 659-66, 692-700
(1995); R. Wilson Freyermuth, Of Hotel Revenues, Rents, and Formalism in the
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property collateral automatically extends to rents arising from that collateral,
even if the debtor does not make an express assignment of those rents. Further, Article 9's baseline rules make clear that upon default (or as otherwise
agreed by the debtor), the secured party can collect rents due from any lessee
of the collateral4 and can take possession of any proceeds of the collateral to
which it is entitled.5
A more cumbersome structure for using rents as security for a mortgage
loan has evolved under real property law. This was not always so. Under the
traditional "title theory" of mortgage law, the mortgage effected a transfer of
legal title to the mortgagee. 6 As an incident of this title, the mortgagee could
collect rents arising from the real property and apply them to the mortgage
debt (unless the mortgage document provided to the contrary).7 Under this
approach, a mortgagee implicitly acquired an interest in the rents arising from
the real property, regardless of whether the mortgagee received an express
assignment of rents. By contrast, under the now-prevailing "lien theory" of
mortgages, the mortgage does not effect a transfer of legal title to the mortgaged real property. Thus, a mortgage in a lien theory state does not implicitly grant the mortgagee a right to collect rents arising from the mortgaged
real property and apply them to the debt.9 Yet because rents reflect the economic return received by the owner in exchange for disposing of the right to
possess or occupy the real property on a temporary basis - i.e., because rents
are "proceeds" of the land in an economic sense - the mortgagee understandably expects to have access to rents arising from the land in the event of
the mortgagor's default. For this reason, most commercial mortgage lenders
require the mortgagor to deliver a separate "assignment of rents" giving the
mortgagee a security interest in rents that accrue from the real property prior
to the completion of a foreclosure.
Because real property rents are economically akin to proceeds, the creation, enforceability, and enforcement of a mortgagee's interest in rents ought
to parallel the creation, perfection, and enforcement of a secured party's interest in proceeds of personal property collateral. Unfortunately, while Article
9 establishes clear statutory rules for proceeds, there has been no uniform
codification of the law governing security in real property rents. To date, only
California has enacted a comprehensive statute governing security interests in
rents;10 most states have minimal or no statutory provisions that directly adBankruptcy Courts: Implicationsfor Reforming Commercial Real Estate Finance,40
UCLA L. REv. 1461, 1524-35 (1993) [hereinafter, Freyermuth, OfHotel Revenues].

4. U.C.C. § 9-607(a)(1) (2001).
5. Id. § 9-607(a)(2).
6. 1

GRANT

S. NELSON &

DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §

4.1, at 153 (4th ed. 2001) [hereinafter

NELSON

&

WHITMAN].

7. Id. at 156.
8. See infra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
9. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 4.2, at 157.
10. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2938 (1993 & Supp. 2005) (amended 1996).
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dress the creation, enforceability, and enforcement of a mortgagee's interest
in rents.
Furthermore, while state law governs the creation, enforceability, and
enforcement of a mortgagee's interest in rents, disputes regarding rents as
security inevitably arise in the bankruptcy context. As a result, federal bankruptcy courts have played the dominant role in elaborating the rules governing whether a mortgagee has properly created a security interest in rents andI
whether it can enforce that interest against third parties and the mortgagor. I
Over the past two decades, this state of affairs has produced a substantial
volume of unnecessary litigation over the creation and enforceability of a
mortgagee's interest in rents. Even worse, this litigation has failed to produce
consensus rules governing the use of rents as security. Courts in many districts have adopted highly mortgagor-favorable rules that placed unreasonable
and inappropriate restrictions upon the mortgagee's ability to collect rents
following the mortgagor's default.' 2 Courts in other districts have adopted
conflicting and highly mortgagee-favorable rules that do not reflect the true
nature of the mortgage as a security transaction.1 3 This body of conflicting
opinion has needlessly increased the transaction costs associated with the
documentation of mortgage loans. Further, it has continued to encourage
wasteful litigation over rents from distressed real property - litigation that
easily would have been avoided if the law had earlier equated the treatment of
real property rents with personal property proceeds.
In the 1990s, California became the only state to enact a comprehensive
assignment of rents statute.1 4 Based in part upon the success of the California
statute, the Joint Editorial Board for Uniform Real Property Acts urged the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL)
to promulgate a uniform act governing the creation, enforceability, and enforcement of a security interest in rents. In 2003, following study, NCCUSL
appointed a drafting committee, which began meeting in December 2003 to
prepare a Uniform Assignment of Rents Act (UARA). 5 At its July 2005 an-

11. As discussed infra notes 105-121 and accompanying text, this is because the
Bankruptcy Code § 544(a) permits the bankruptcy trustee to avoid any security interest that a judicial lien creditor or a bona fide purchaser of non-fixture real property
could have avoided under state law on the petition date.
12. See infra notes 105-121, 146-156 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 125-140 and accompanying text.
14. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2938 (1993 & Supp. 2005) (amended 1996).
15. Consistent with NCCUSL's process, NCCUSL's Scope and Program Committee requested study regarding whether an act would fit NCCUSL's relevance and
enactability guidelines for uniform acts. See Study Committee's report, available at
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/scope&program/RptMrtgAccess_0603.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2006). Interim drafts of UARA during the drafting process are available
on the NCCUSL website.
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nual meeting in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, NCCUSL
approved the UARA and
16
recommended its adoption in the various states.
This Article explains the provisions of the UARA and encourages its
prompt adoption in states that presently lack comprehensive statutes governing security interests in rents. Part I provides a general background about
state mortgage law and the nature of the mortgagee's right to rents arising
from the mortgaged premises, as well as the general impact of the federal
Bankruptcy Code upon a mortgagee's security interest in rents. 7 In Part II,
the Article highlights four problem areas that have produced substantial litigation and uncertainty about the enforceability of security interests in rents in
8
the bankruptcy context. These are (a) the proper scope of the term "rents";'
(b) when a security interest in rents has been properly "perfected"; 19 (c)
whether a mortgagor can make an "absolute" assignment of rents (as opposed
to an assignment for purposes of security); 20 and (d) whether a security interest in rents creates an interest that is distinct from the mortgaged real property
from which the rents arise. 21 Part II chronicles the litigation produced by
these issues and summarizes the solutions that the UARA provides for each
of these issues. In Part III, the Article highlights a variety of other issues relating to the collection of rents, including: (a) the standards governing the
appointment of a receiver; 22 (b) the mortgagor's liability for "milking" rents
(i.e., collecting rents after default without directing them to the payment of
the mortgage debt); 23 (c) collection of rents by the mortgagee via direct notification to tenants; 24 (d) the extent to which a mortgagee that collects rents
must apply those rents2 to the payment of taxes and other property-related
26
expenses; 25 (e) priority among competing assignments of rents; (f) priority
between an assignee of rents and a person holding an interest in the proceeds
of rents arising under UCC Article 9; 27 and (g) the effect of the mortgagee's
collection of rents upon the mortgagee's ability to enforce the mortgage
debt. 28 The Article discusses prevailing authority with respect to each issue,
particularly highlighting the manner in which the UARA would resolve these
16. See New Act Facilitatesthe Financingof Rental Real Estate Properties(July
28, 2005), available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopModules/NewsDisplay.aspx?ItemlD= 146 (NCCUSL press release).
17. See infra notes 29-43 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 48-104 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 105-124 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 125-145 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 146-162 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 171-190 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 191-200 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 201-212 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 213-223 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 224-232 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 233-245 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 246-255 and accompanying text.
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issues. The Article concludes with an Appendix that sets forth a bullet-point
summary of the primary provisions of the UARA.
I. BACKGROUND
A. State MortgageLaw and the Nature of the Mortgagee's "Right" to
Rents
An assignment of leases and rents can serve a number of practical purposes, but its most significant purpose is to provide a mortgage lender with
the ability to collect rents that accrue from the mortgaged real property between the mortgagor's default and a completed foreclosure. 29 In states that
permit only judicial foreclosure, 30 the foreclosure process can be quite
lengthy - in most states, from six months to a year (and in some cases, in
excess of one year).3' In this situation, a mortgage lender faces a heightened
risk that while foreclosure is pending, the borrower may collect rents and
spend them, rather than applying them to reduce the mortgage debt - a process known as "milking" the rents. 32 By taking an assignment of leases and
rents, the lender manifests its intention to have a lien upon all rents accruing
from the land during the term of the mortgage loan (i.e., until the mortgage
loan is repaid or until the mortgagee completes a foreclosure after default).
The assignment of rents and leases typically permits the mortgagee to take
steps following the mortgagor's default to collect rents accruing from the
mortgaged premises and apply them to the mortgage debt. These steps may
include, inter alia, taking physical possession of the premises (becoming a
"mortgagee in possession"), obtaining the appointment of a receiver for the
premises, or notifying tenants occupying the premises to direct all future rent
payments to the mortgagee.

29. Once the foreclosure process is complete, the foreclosure sale purchaser can
thereafter collect rents as an incident of its ownership of the land. Thus, an assignment of rents serves primarily to protect the mortgagee's ability to collect rents that
accrue while a foreclosure is pending.
30. See FORECLOSURE LAW & RELATED REMEDIES: A STATE-BY-STATE DIGEST
(ABA 1995) (foreclosure by judicial process only in Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Vermont, and Wisconsin).
31. Id. at 184 (six to eighteen months in Kansas), 381 (eight to twenty-two
months in New Jersey), 443 (eight to twelve months in Ohio), 557 (six to twelve
months in Vermont).
32. This risk is heightened in states that permit the borrower to remain in possession of the real property during a post-sale statutory redemption period. For a general
discussion of post-sale statutory redemption and a recognition of the risk that statutory redemption may encourage milking of rents, see NELSON & WHITMAN, supra
note 6, § 8.4, at 772-75.

HeinOnline -- 71 Mo. L. Rev. 5 2006

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

To understand the current state of modem law governing a mortgagee's
access to rents as security, one must first appreciate the historical development of mortgage law and the mortgagee's right to rents. At early common
law, the mortgage operated as an outright conveyance of title to the mortgagee, typically upon a condition subsequent. 33 By virtue of this title transfer,
the mortgagee received all incidents of legal title, including the right to possession of the land and the right to collect rents accruing from the land. More
importantly, the mortgagee could exercise these incidents even prior to the
mortgagor's default (absent contrary agreement).34
Under this "title" theory, the right to collect rents was an incident of the
mortgagee's legal estate. As a result, there was no need for a mortgagee to
take a separate assignment of rents to secure a mortgage debt. Nevertheless,
even in American states that adopted the title theory of mortgages, mortgage
lenders commonly require assignments of rents in commercial mortgage
transactions. This is not surprising because parties to a mortgage understand it
to-be only a security device. In the typical case, the parties expect the mortgagor to occupy the premises and to collect rents that accrue prior to default even if the baseline title theory rule would provide otherwise. Thus, even in
title theory states, mortgage documentation commonly provides for an assignment of rents to the mortgagee, but permits the mortgagorto collect rents
that accrue prior to default.
Over time, the majority of American states have rejected the title theory
of mortgages in favor of the "lien" theory. 35 Under the lien theory, a mortgage grants the mortgagee only a right of security, capable of being enforced
via foreclosure in the event of the mortgagor's default. Until such enforcement occurs, the mortgage does not convey to the mortgagee legal title to the
land. Accordingly, the mortgage does not implicitly convey any of the ordinary incidents of title, such as the right to collect rents accruing from the
land.36 This means that a lien theory mortgagee would have no way to collect
rents (at least those rents that accrued prior to completion of a foreclosure
33. If the mortgagor successfully repaid the loan on a timely basis, this triggered
the condition subsequent and permitted the mortgagor to re-enter the premises and
terminate the mortgagee's estate. Id. § 1.2, at 6.
34. Initially, this structure permitted the mortgagee to collect rents and profits
from the land as a substitute for interest, which violated ecclesiastical and legal prohibitions on usury. Id. § 1.2, at 7.

35. Id. § 4.2, at 156-60 & n.1 (noting that at least 32 states follow the lien theory). Likewise, the Restatement adopts the lien theory. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4. 1(a) (1997) ("A mortgage creates only a security interest in
real estate and confers no right to possession of that real estate on the mortgagee.").
36. A few states (including Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Vermont)
adopted an "intermediate" theory, under which the mortgagee's right to possession
accrues immediately upon default by the mortgagor, even if the mortgagee has not yet
instituted or completed foreclosure proceedings. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, §
4.3, at 160 & n.l.
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sale) unless the mortgage documentation specifically assigned those rents as
collateral. Thus, in lien theory states, it became customary for a commercial
mortgage lender to require the mortgagor to execute an assignment of leases
and rents from the mortgaged real property (in addition to the mortgage itself).
Therefore, with respect to the mortgagee's right to rents, whether the jurisdiction follows the title theory or the lien theory is largely irrelevant in the
typical mortgage transaction. Instead, the mortgage documents make clear
that (a) the mortgagee grants a lien upon the rents accruing from the mortgaged premises, (b) the mortgagor has the right to collect the rents prior to
default, and (c) following default, the mortgagee can enforce its lien upon the
rents and collect rents that accrue while the mortgagor remains in default.
B. The PotentialImpact of Bankruptcy
As a starting point, state law governs the creation and enforcement of
security interests in rents. 37 Nevertheless, federal bankruptcy courts actually
resolve most disputes regarding security interests in rents, because defaulting
mortgagors often resort to bankruptcy to take advantage of the automatic stay
afforded to bankrupt debtors. Generally speaking, the filing of a bankruptcy
petition stays any creditor action to enforce a claim that arose prior to the
bankruptcy petition - including an attempt by a mortgagee to foreclose its
mortgage - and requires the administration of creditor claims in a collective
proceeding supervised by the bankruptcy court.38 When a mortgagor of commercial real property files for bankruptcy, a battle generally develops over the
rents that will accrue during the pendency of the bankruptcy case ("postpetition rents"). The mortgagor - often an entity that owns no significant assets other than the mortgaged real property - wants to use post-petition rents
to fund its effort to restructure the mortgage debt and to pay professional fees
and expenses. In contrast, the mortgagee - who could have taken steps to
collect those rents and apply them to the mortgage debt, but for the intervention of the automatic stay - wants to preserve those post-petition rents so that
they can be applied to the mortgage debt if necessary.
As a general matter, the Bankruptcy Code preserves any security interest
acquired prior to bankruptcy that was both valid and enforceable against
third-party creditors under state law. 39 Thus, if a mortgage was properly executed, delivered, and recorded prior to bankruptcy, 40 the mortgage lien continues to remain effective against the mortgaged land following the bank37. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979).
38. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (2000) (filing of bankruptcy petition operates as
stay of "any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate").
39. Id. § 544(a).
40. Under state law, recording of a mortgage is necessary in order to make the
mortgage effective against subsequent bona fide purchasers of the land. See, e.g., Mo.
REv. STAT. § 442.400 (2000); see generally WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A.
WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 11.9 (3d ed. 2000).
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ruptcy petition. Section 552(a) of the Code, however, generally cuts off the
enforceability of a pre-petition security agreement to the extent that the agreement would otherwise cover after-acquired property.4' Section 552(a) serves
an important economic function, as an after-acquired property clause (if it
remained legally effective) would prevent the debtor from using assets acquired post-petition as collateral to obtain the credit necessary to fund its
reorganization.
If section 552(a) applied by its terms to commercial real estate mortgages, a mortgagee with a pre-petition lien upon rents would lose that lien as
to post-petition rents. But Congress considered this result inappropriate, because rents are in the nature of a direct economic return upon the land - i.e.,
in the nature of "proceeds" - and bankruptcy generally respects the lender's
pre-petition lien against the land. Congress thus enacted section 552(b),
which allows the mortgagee to retain its lien against post-petition "rents" of
the mortgaged premises to the extent provided by underlying state law and
the parties' loan documentation. Therefore, if the mortgagee has a valid and
properly perfected pre-petition lien upon both real estate and its rents, section
552(b) permits the mortgagee to retain a lien against post-petition rents.
These post-petition rents constitute the mortgagee's "cash collateral" - a designation that significantly limits the bankrupt debtor's flexibility in spending
post-petition rents and provides the mortgagee with significant leverage in the
bankruptcy proceeding.43
II. "PROBLEM AREAS" OF LITIGATION REGARDING ASSIGNMENTS OF
RENTS

The past two decades have produced a great deal of wasteful litigation
over a number of issues relating to the proper characterization and treatment
of assignments
of rents. These issues are: (a) the proper scope of the term
"rents"; 44 (b) when a security interest in rents has been properly "per41. 11 U.S.C. § 552(a) (2000) ("Except as provided in [section 552(b)], property
acquired by the estate or by the debtor after the commencement of the case is not
subject to any lien resulting from any security agreement entered into by the debtor
before the commencement of the case.").
42. Id. § 552(b).
43. Section 363(a) of the Bankruptcy Code defines "cash collateral" to include
"cash... or other cash equivalents whenever acquired in which the estate and an entity
other than the estate have an interest ...." Id. § 363(a). This specifically includes the
"rent[s] or profits of property and the fees, charges, accounts or other payments for the
use or occupancy of rooms and other public facilities in hotels, motels, or other lodging
properties subject to a security interest .
I..."
Id. The bankrupt debtor may not use a
creditor's cash collateral unless that creditor consents or unless the court authorizes that
use following notice and a hearing, id.§ 363(c)(2), and then only after providing the
creditor with adequate protection of its security interest. Id.§ 363(e).
44. See infra notes 48-104 and accompanying text.
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fected"; 45 (c) whether a mortgagor can make an "absolute" assignment of
rents (as opposed to an assignment for purposes of security) and the effect of
such an "absolute" assignment; 46 and (d) whether a security interest in rents
creates an interest that is distinct from the mortgaged real property from
which the rents arise.47 While debtors and mortgage lenders have fought most
of these issues in bankruptcy courts, each issue turns primarily upon state law
regarding security interests in rents. Part II chronicles the litigation surrounding
these issues and discusses the manner in which the UARA would resolve them.
A. Characterizationof Revenues Paidby Occupiers - Exactly What
Are "Rents "?
1. Introducing the State Law Classification Dilemma
In the typical commercial mortgage loan, the lender secures the borrower's obligation by requiring the borrower to grant a security interest in the
revenues paid by occupiers of the development. In many developments (e.g.,
office buildings, industrial parks, retail shopping centers, and apartment complexes), the owner and occupiers of the development stand in landlord-tenant
relationships based upon the execution of leases covering portions of the development. Because the common law traditionally treated unaccrued rents as
an interest in land (an incorporeal hereditament),48 a mortgage lender taking a
security interest in the "rents" due under tenant leases must comply with real
estate law's requirements to obtain and enforce that security interest. This
means that the lender must have the mortgagor execute and deliver an instrument sufficient to convey an interest in "rents" (typically called an "Assignment of Leases and Rents" or simply an "Assignment of Rents"), and must
record that instrument on the public land records in the county where the land
is situated.
In many developments, however, the owner and the occupiers do not
stand in the relationship of landlord and tenant, but in the relationship of licensor-licensee. Examples of this type of project include
nursing homes,49
° golf courses,5 1 landfills, 52 marinas,5 3 stadiums or arenas,54
parking garages,5
45. See infra notes 105-124 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 125-145 and accompanying text.
47. See infra notes 146-162 and accompanying text.

48. Independence Tube Corp. v. Levine (In re Tavern Motor Inn, Inc.), 80 B.R.
659, 661-62 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1987); Freyermuth, Of Hotel Revenues, supra note 3, at
1481 & n.78.
49. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Hillside Assocs. (In re Hillside Assocs. Ltd.
P'ship), 121 B.R. 23 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1990) (per curiam); Home Say. Ass'n of Kansas
City v. Woodstock Assocs. I, Inc. (In re Woodstock Assocs. I, Inc.), 120 B.R. 436
(Bankr. N.D. I11.
1990).
50. In re Ashford Apartments Ltd. P'ship, 132 B.R. 217 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991).
51. In re GGVXX, Ltd., 130 B.R. 322 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991).
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student dormitories, 55 and hotels. 56 Even in a project where most occupiers are
"tenants," such as in an enclosed regional mall, certain of the occupiers may be
only licensees, such as persons operating an open-area "kiosk" pursuant to
agreements that permit the mall owner to relocate the kiosk within the mall's
common areas. Finally, even some projects where the occupants have executed
"leases" may not be treated by courts as "leases" under landlord-tenant law. For
example, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania recently ruled that agreements for occupancy of self-storage facilities did not create real property interests in favor of the occupiers - even though the agreements were denominated
as "leases" - because "the customers' [control] rights are so limited 57
that they do
not take on most of the usual indicia of an interest in real property."
If a development's occupiers are licensees and not tenants, a significant
classification problem arises. Are the occupiers' payment obligations "rents"
governed by real estate law, such that the lender would obtain and record an
assignment of rents in the land records? Or are those obligations "accounts"
subject to UCC Article 9, such that the lender would have to create a security
interest in present and after-acquired accounts and perfect that interest by
58
filing a financing statement covering accounts in the UCC filing system?
This classification dilemma creates a potential trap for the unwary lender. For
example, a marina lender (believing that boat slip fees constitute "rents")
might document a loan transaction by having the borrower execute and record
an assignment of rents - only to later face a successful judicial challenge that
the boat slip fees constituted "accounts" governed by Article 9. During the
1980s and early 1990s, hotel lenders that had taken an "assignments of rents"
found themselves frequent targets of such challenges, and courts frequently
held that such lenders had no security interest in room revenues at all (or at
best an unperfected security interest in those revenues). 59
52. In re W. Chestnut Realty of Haverford, Inc., 166 B.R. 53 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.

1993).
53. In re Northport Marina Assocs., 136 B.R. 911 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992).
54. Zeeway Corp. v. Rio Salado Bank (In re Zeeway Corp.), 71 B.R. 210 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 1987).
55. Cook v. Univ. Plaza, 427 N.E.2d 405 (I11.
Ct. App. 1981).
56. See cases cited infra notes 59, 63, and 64.
57. Ne. Oxford Enters. LP v. City of Phila. Tax Review Bd., 834 A.2d 650, 654
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003). This decision addressed the issue of whether liability for the
City's use and occupancy tax on real estate properly rested upon the "lessor" or the
"lessee" under these occupancy agreements. Id. at 651-52. The reasoning of the
court's conclusion, however, could just as easily be extrapolated to the analysis of
whether the sums paid by the "lessees" under those agreements were "rents" in the
nature of real property or "accounts" subject to Article 9.
58. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (2001) ("'Account' . . . means a right to payment of a
monetary obligation, whether or not earned by performance ... for property that has
been or is to be sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed of ....
").
59. Initially, some lenders that failed to anticipate the characterization issue
made hotel mortgage loans based solely upon a mortgage and an assignment of rents,
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But for bankruptcy law, a prudent lender could moot the state law classification dilemma through preventive lawyering. For example, the marina
lender could (a) require the borrower to execute both an assignment of rents
and an Article 9 security agreement covering present and future accounts, (b)
record the assignment of rents in the appropriate land records, and (c) file a
financing statement covering accounts in the appropriate UCC filing office.
This "belt and suspenders" approach would appear to give the lender a perfected security interest in unaccrued occupancy revenues, regardless
of how
6
state law resolved the "realty or personalty" classification question. 0
Unfortunately, the intervention of bankruptcy means that preventive
drafting alone cannot completely solve the classification dilemma. As discussed earlier, Bankruptcy Code section 552(a) provides that any pre-petition
security agreement covering after-acquired property does not attach to property that the bankruptcy estate acquires post-petition. By itself, section 552(a)
would suggest that a lender's security interest in pre-petition revenues would
not attach to post-petition revenues. In turn, this would mean that those reve-

without taking or perfecting a security interest in accounts. Others had mortgages that
contained language broad enough to grant a security interest in hotel room revenues, but
(considering those revenues to be "rents") failed to file a financing statement covering
accounts so as to perfect that security interest. In bankruptcy, courts held that these
lenders either had no security interest in post-petition revenues at all, or that any such
security interest was unperfected. See, e.g., United States v. PS Hotel Corp., 404 F.
Supp. 1188, 1191-92 (E.D. Mo. 1975); In re Gen. Associated Investors Ltd. P'ship, 150
B.R. 756, 759-62 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1993); Greyhound Real Estate Fin. Co. v. Official
Unsecured Creditors' Comm. (In re Northview Corp.), 130 B.R. 543, 546-48 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 1991); In re Tri-Growth Ctr. City, Ltd., 133 B.R. 524, 526 (Bankr. S.D. Cal.
1991); In re Corpus Christi Hotel Partners, Ltd., 133 B.R. 850, 854 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1991); In re Nendels-Medford Joint Venture, 127 B.R. 658, 663-68 (Bankr. D. Or.
1991); In re Majestic Motel Assocs., 131 B.R. 523, 526 (Bankr. D. Me. 1991); In re
Shore Haven Motor Inns, Inc., 124 B.R. 617, 618 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991); Airport Inn
Assocs., Ltd. v. Travelers Ins. Co. (In re Airport Inn Assocs., Ltd.), 132 B.R. 951, 954
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); Sacramento Mansion, Ltd. v. Sacramento Sav. & Loan Ass'n
(In re Sacramento Mansion, Ltd.), 117 B.R. 592, 606 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); In re
Oceanview/Virginia Beach Real Estate Assocs., 116 B.R. 57, 58-59 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
1990); Super 8 Motel, Inc. v. M. Vickers, Ltd. (In re M. Vickers, Ltd.), Ill B.R. 332,
335-37 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990); Inv. Hotel Props., Ltd. v. New W. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n (In re Inv. Hotel Props., Ltd.), 109 B.R. 990, 993-94 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990);
Kearney Hotel Partners v. Richardson (In re Kearney Hotel Partners), 92 B.R. 95, 98102 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); Victor Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Grimm (In re Greater At. &
Pac. Investor Group, Inc.), 88 B.R. 356, 359 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1988); In re Ashkenazy
Enters., Inc., 94 B.R. 645, 646-47 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1986).
60. Of course, the duplicate preparation and recording/filing costs involved with
this "belt and suspenders" approach effectively increases the transaction costs associated with the origination of such loans. These increased costs could be avoided if
commercial law could resolve the classification dilemma in a clearer fashion.
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nues would not constitute the lender's cash collateral - the debtor's use of
which is governed by the relatively strict limitations set forth in section 363.61
Congress drew a careful distinction, however, between property received by the debtor post-petition and post-petition proceeds of pre-petition
collateral. Section 552(b) reflects this distinction, providing that a valid and
properly perfected pre-petition security interest in collateral will attach to any
rents, profits, and proceeds of that collateral that the debtor receives postpetition. 62 The language of section 552(b) thus makes the classification question crucial for the commercial mortgagee. If post-petition occupancy revenues are "rents," "profits," or "proceeds" of the land, the lender's pre-petition
security interest in rents continues to attach to those post-petition revenues. If
the post-petition occupancy revenues are not "rents," "profits," or "proceeds"
of the land, however, section 552(a) operates to extinguish the lender's interest in post-petition occupancy revenues.
Most bankruptcy cases addressing the classification question have involved security interests in hotel room charges. Prior to 1994, some decisions
treated hotel room charges as the functional equivalent of tenant rents, and
concluded that section 552(b) preserved a lender's properly perfected security
interest in post-petition hotel room charges. 63 Most courts, however, con61. The Bankruptcy Code provides that the trustee/debtor-in-possession "may
not use, sell, or lease cash collateral" unless the secured creditor consents or the court
so authorizes following notice and a hearing. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2) (2000). The trustee/debtor-in-possession must "segregate and account for any cash collateral" in its
possession and control. Id. § 363(c)(4). Further, the bankruptcy court cannot authorize
the use of cash collateral in any event unless the trustee/debtor-in-possession can
provide "adequate protection" of the secured creditor's interest in that cash collateral,
id. § 363(e), or unless the court concludes that allowing such use would be consistent
with the "equities of the case." Id. § 552(b).
62. Prior to 1994, § 552(b) read as follows:
[I]f the debtor and [the] secured party enter into a security agreement before the commencement of the case and if the ... security agreement extends to property of the debtor acquired before the commencement of the
case and to proceeds,product, offspring, rents, orprofits ofsuch property,
then such security interest extends to such proceeds, product, offspring,
rents, or profits acquired by the estate after the commencement of the case
to the extent provided by such security agreement and by applicable nonbankruptcy law ....
An Act to Establish a Uniform Law on the Subject of Bankruptcies, Pub. L. No. 95598, § 5529 (1978) (prior to 1994 amendment) (emphasis added).
63. See, e.g., Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Tollman-Hundley Dalton, L.P., 74 F.3d
1120 (11 th Cir. 1996); Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. v. Days Cal. Riverside Ltd. P'ship
(In re Days Cal. Riverside Ltd. P'ship), 27 F.3d 374 (9th Cir. 1994); T-H New Orleans Ltd. P'ship v. Fin. Sec. Assurance, Inc. (In re T-H New Orleans Ltd. P'ship), 10
F.3d 1099 (5th Cir. 1993); Great-W. Life & Annuity Assur. Co. v. Parke Imperial
Canton, Ltd., 177 B.R. 843 (N.D. Ohio 1994); Bellevue Place Assocs. v. Caisse Centrale Des Banques Populaires (In re Bellevue Place Assocs.), 173 B.R. 1009 (Bankr.
N.D. Ill. 1994); In re S.F. Drake Hotel Assocs., 131 B.R. 156, 158-61 (Bankr. N.D.
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cluded that post-petition hotel room charges were after-acquired accounts
(personal property) and were neither "rents," "profits," nor "proceeds" of the
land.64 These courts typically applied the formalistic reasoning that room
charges could not be "rents" because hotel guests were not "tenants." As a
result, many bankruptcy courts routinely invalidated lenders' claimed interests in post-petition hotel room charges.
2. Analysis of (and Potential Solutions to) the Classification Dilemma
Formalistic invalidation of a hotel lender's interest in post-petition room
charges is inappropriate, as hotel room charges are functionally identical to
"rents" paid by tenants under apartment, office, or industrial leases.65 In economic terms, the developer's right to payments under its contracts with occupiers - whether tenants or licensees - constitutes an economic return upon the
productive capacity of the development, as the occupiers of the development
consume that productive capacity over time.66 In this regard, rents, hotel room
charges and other forms of occupancy revenues are fundamentally analogous
to "proceeds" as that term is used in UCC Article 9.67 Thus, when used as
collateral to secure a mortgage loan, all post-petition revenues paid for occupancy of commercial real estate should fit within the scope of post-petition
revenues protected by section 552(b).
Cal. 1991), affd, 147 B.R. 538 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Mid-City Hotel Assocs. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. (In re Mid-City Hotel Assocs.), 114 B.R. 634, 638-42 (Bankr. D.
Minn. 1990); Great-W. Life Assurance Co. v. Raintree Inn, 837 P.2d 267 (Colo. App.
1992); Travelers Ins. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 621 N.E.2d 209 (II1.App. 1993)
64. See, e.g., In re Northview Corp., 130 B.R. at 548; Casco N. Bank, N.A. v.
Green Corp. (In re Green Corp.), 154 B.R. 819 (Bankr. D. Me. 1993); In re Airport
Inn Assocs., Ltd., 132 B.R. at 960; In re Majestic Motel Assocs., 131 B.R. 523; In re
Shore Haven Motor Inn, Inc., 124 B.R. 617; In re Corpus Christi Hotel Partners, Ltd.,
133 B.R. at 854-55; In re Sacramento Mansion, Ltd., 117 B.R. at 602-07; In re Inv.
Hotel Props., Ltd., 109 B.R. at 994-97.
65. See, e.g., Freyermuth, Of Hotel Revenues, supra note 3; R. Wilson Freyermuth, The Circus Continues - Security Interests in Rents, Congress, the Bankruptcy
Courts, and the "Rents Are Subsumed in the Land" Hypothesis, 6 J. BANKR. L. &
PRAc. 115 (1997) [hereinafter Freyermuth, The Circus Continues].
66. Freyermuth, The Circus Continues, supra note 65, at 126-27.
67. Id. This is not to suggest that they are actually "proceeds" as defined in Article 9. Under Article 9, "proceeds" constitutes "whatever is acquired upon the sale,
lease, license, exchange, or other disposition of collateral." U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(64)(A)
(2001). In turn, Article 9 defines "collateral" to mean "the property subject to a security interest," id. § 9-102(a)(12), and this would exclude land, because by definition
an Article 9 security interest can arise only in personal property or fixtures. Id. § 1201 (b)(35). Thus, because land cannot be Article 9 collateral, the rents cannot constitute Article 9 "proceeds." Nevertheless, they are certainly in the nature of proceeds, as
manifested by the fact that equipment lease rentals do constitute Article 9 proceeds of
the equipment.
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Recognizing that bankruptcy court decisions in hotel cases unjustly penalized lenders, Congress amended section 552(b) in 1994 to provide explicit
protection for a lender's interest in post-petition "fees, charges, accounts, or
other payments for the use or occupancy of rooms and other public facilities
in hotels, motels, or other lodging properties." 68 This amendment effectively
mooted the classification dilemma with respect to hotels and other "lodging
properties." Unfortunately, the amendment did not address a wide variety of
7°
69
other income-generating projects - such as golf courses, parking garages,
marinas, 71 landfills, 72 and stadiums or arenas 73 - in which the end-users also
are not "tenants."
As a result, the amended section 552(b) does not completely solve the
classification dilemma. For example, if the revenues from a parking garage
are "rents" within the meaning of state law and section 552(b), then a lender's
assignment of rents on the garage would attach to post-petition revenues from
the garage. However, if they are "accounts," then the lender runs a heightened
risk that its security interest in post-petition revenues from the garage - even
if properly documented in the first instance - could be cut off by virtue of
section 552(b). 74 Accordingly, the basic classification dilemma remains: what
68. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (as amended in 1994).
69. Most courts have concluded that greens fees do not constitute "rents," "profits," or "proceeds" of the land entitled to protection under § 552(b). See, e.g., In re
McKim, 217 B.R. 97 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1998); In re Everett Home Town Ltd. P'ship,
146 B.R. 453 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992); In re McCann, 140 B.R. 926 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1992); In re GGVXX, Ltd., 130 B.R. 322 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991)
70. In re Ashford Apartments Ltd. P'ship, 132 B.R. 217 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1991)
(parking fees in nature of "rents").
71. Compare In re Northport Marina Assocs., 136 B.R. 911 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1992) (fees paid by marina users for assigned slip for periods of six months or more
were in nature of "rents," while fees paid by transitory users were "accounts"), with
First Am. Bank of Va. v. Harbor Pointe Ltd. P'ship (In re Harbour Pointe Ltd.
P'ship), 132 B.R. 501 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1991) (fees generated by marina treated as
"rents") and In re Hamlin's Landing Joint Venture, 77 B.R. 916 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1987) (same).
72. In re W. Chestnut Realty of Haverford, Inc., 166 B.R. 53 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1993), aff'd, 173 B.R. 322 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
73. See, e.g., Klingner v. Pocono Int'l Raceway, Inc., 433 A.2d 1357 (Pa. Super.
1981); Zeeway Corp. v. Rio Salado Bank (In re Zeeway Corp.), 71 B.R. 210 (B.A.P.
9th Cir. 1987).
74. Without question, the most preferable solution to the classification dilemma
would be to say that post-petition garage revenues (and other sums paid by non-tenant
users and occupiers) are both "accounts" under state law (UCC Article 9) and "rents"
or "proceeds" under federal law as those terms are used in Code section 552(b). This
treatment makes sense in economic terms, see supra notes 65-67 and accompanying
text, and there is support in the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code for an expansive definition of these terms. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595 (1977), reprintedin 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6332-33 ("The term 'proceeds' is not limited to the technical
definition of that term in the U.C.C., but covers any property into which property
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is the fundamental character of the income produced by the occupancy of
commercial real estate?
The law could simply choose to retain the formalistic rents/accounts distinction recognized by the weight of bankruptcy court authority and limit the
term "rents" to sums payable by "tenants." Under this approach, occupancy
revenue would constitute "rents" only when produced by projects like office
buildings, shopping centers, and apartments - and only when payable by an
occupier that in fact held a possessory estate in the land. All other occupancy
revenues paid by non-tenants - even though such revenues might be paid in
exchange for the right to occupy or use land - would constitute personal property collateral ("accounts") within the scope of UCC Article 9. This approach,
however, not only retains the existing "trap for the unwary" - i.e., using an
"assignment of rents" when the occupancy revenues do not constitute "rents" but also subjects the mortgagee to the risk of losing its security interest in postpetition occupancy revenues that are not "rents" under section 552(a).
By contrast, previous law reform efforts and commentators have advanced two alternative solutions to the classification dilemma. First, the law
could treat the right to payment under any occupancy agreement for land including tenant leases - as an "account" subject to Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Second, the law could maintain the traditional realty
(rents) vs. personalty (accounts) distinction, yet define "rents" more broadly
to include sums payable by occupiers of land other than tenants.
a. Rents as Article 9 Collateral?
From the date of its original enactment, Article 9 has excluded from its
scope liens upon real property. Section 9-109(d)( 11) provides that Article 9
"does not apply to ... the creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real

property, including a lease or rents thereunder." 75 As a result, in a commercial
real estate mortgage transaction covering real property in which the end-users
occupy the property under leases, the lender must comply with the requirean assignment of rents and re- i.e., by obtaining
ments of mortgage
•76
•
. law
cording that assignment on the public land records.
Article 9's exclusion of a lien upon rents stands in stark contrast to the
manner in which Article 9 treats a security assignment of a vendor's right to
payment arising out of a contract for the sale of land. Under pre-revision Article 9, the rights to payment arising out of a contract for the sale of land con-

subject to the security interest is converted."). Unfortunately, as the hotel cases (cited
supra note 64) demonstrate, bankruptcy courts have tended to give the terms "rents"
and "proceeds" as used in section 552(b) the same meaning given to them by state law
- and thus have refused to treat these sums as both "accounts" under state law and
"proceeds" under section 552(b).
75. U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(1 1) (2001); see also id. § 9-1040) (1972 version).
76. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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stituted a "general intangible" under Article 9,77 and most courts concluded
that an assignment of a vendor's interest under an installment land contract
created a security interest in a general intangible subject to the provisions of
Article 9.78 Under revised Article 9, the vendor's right to payment under a
contract for the sale of land now constitutes an "account," which is defined to
include any "right to payment of a monetary obligation, whether or not
earned by performance ... for property that has been or is to be sold.",7 9 As a
result, if V sells Blackacre to P by installment land contract, and later V borrows money from M and assigns to M as security its rights under the Blackacre installment contract, M's collateral is an "account." To create and perfect
a security interest in the vendor's right to payment under the contract, M must
have V execute a security agreement granting a security interest in this "account" and file a financing statement covering the account in the appropriate
UCC filing office.80 Even though the right to payment arises out of a contract
for the sale of real property, commercial law treats this right to payment as
personal property collateral.

77. Under pre-revision Article 9, the term "account" was defined as "any right to
payment for goods sold or leased or for services rendered ....U.C.C. § 9-106 (1972
text). An installment land contract vendor's right to installment payments could not
constitute an account under that definition, as "goods" did not include land. Id. § 9105(1)(h) (1972 text) ("'Goods' includes all things which are movable at the time the
security interest attaches ....
").
As a result, courts held that the installment land contract vendor's rights to payment fell within the category of "general intangibles,"
which was Article 9's "catch-all" category for property that fit no other Article 9
definition. See id. § 9-106 (1972 text) ("'General intangibles' means any personal
property (including things in action) other than goods, accounts, chattel paper, documents, instruments, investment property, rights to proceeds under written letters of
credit, and money.").
78. See, e.g., Heide v. Mading King County Enters., Inc. (In re Heide), 915 F.2d
531, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1990) (applying Washington law); Frearson v. Wingold (In re
Equitable Dev. Corp.), 617 F.2d 1152, 1155-57 (5th Cir. 1980) (applying Florida
law); I.A. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson Nat'l Bank (In re I.A. Durbin, Inc.), 46 B.R. 595,
599 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); N. Acres, Inc. v. Hillman State Bank (In re N. Acres,
Inc.), 52 B.R. 641, 644-47 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984); Borock v. N.B.D. Dearborn
Bank (In re D.J. Maltese, Inc.), 42 B.R. 589, 591-92 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1984); Nazar
v. Southern (In re Southern), 32 B.R. 761, 764-65 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983); Castle
Rock Indus. Bank v. S.O.A.W. Enters., Inc. (In re S.O.A.W. Enters., Inc.), 32 B.R.
279, 284-86 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1983); Gemini at Dadeland, Ltd. v. Biscayne Bank (In
re Gemini at Dadeland Ltd.), 24 B.R. 57, 58 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); Sw. Bank v.
Southworth (In re Southworth), 22 B.R. 376, 378-79 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982); Sec.
Bank v. Chiapuzio, 747 P.2d 335, 336-43 (Or. 1987); Citicorp Pers.-to-Pers. Fin. Ctr.,
Inc. v. Fremont Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 29, 31-32 (Colo. App. 1987); Crichton v. Himlie Props., Inc., 713 P.2d 108, 110 (Wash. 1986); Freeborn v. Seattle Trust & Sav.
Bank (In re Freeborn), 617 P.2d 424, 427-29 (Wash. 1980).
79. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(2) (2001).
80. Id. § 9-310(a).
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In classifying the interests arising from an installment land contract,
commercial law has thus separated the vendor's interest in the land itself from
the vendor's contractual rights to payment under the contract. To this extent,
the installment land contract provides a plain and functional analogue to the
lease. The vendee's promise to perform an installment land contract gives the
vendee an interest in land; likewise, the lessee's promise to perform the terms
of its lease gives the lessee an interest in land. While the vendor retains legal
title to the land during the term of the contract, commercial law treats the
vendor's contract rights to payment (if assigned as security for a debt) as personal property in the nature of an account. To some extent, this classification
reflects that the assignee's primary concern is to obtain security in the
vendee's installment payments. Likewise, one could separate the assignment
of a lease into real and personal property components, as commercial law has
done with the installment land contract. Security law could characterize the
assignment of a lease as transferring both an interest in realty (the lessor's
reversionary interest in the land) and an interest in the lessor's contractual
rights under the lease (including the lessor's right to collect the lessee's contract payments) - with the latter interest (the rents) characterized as personal
property.
Further, because a developer's right to collect occupancy payments constitutes a return on the economic value of the development, Article 9 and its
proceeds rule provide a structural framework that is frankly superior to the
traditional common law of real property. In defining the term "proceeds,"
Article 9's drafters did not distinguish between sums received upon sale of
collateral and sums received upon the lease of collateral - both sums constitute "proceeds" under Article 9, with the secured party's interest in the collat8
eral following automatically into identifiable proceeds of the collateral. 1
Article 9's proceeds coverage rules provide equivalent treatment of a lender's
interest in the economic return generated by collateral, whether that return
comes from a one-time sale, an installment sale, or a lease.
A decade ago, Julia Forrester and I proposed in separate articles that
bringing rents within the scope of Article 9 would provide greater coherence
to commercial law, by unifying the treatment of an assignment of rents with
the treatment of security in accounts receivable. 82 Such a characterization
would permit parties to mortgage transactions to use now-familiar Article 9
serules as a framework for the creation, perfection and enforcement of any 83
land.
by
generated
revenues
occupancy
collect
to
right
curity interest in the
81. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
82. Freyermuth, Of Hotel Revenues, supra note 3, at 1520; Julia Patterson Forrester, A Uniform and More RationalApproach to Rents as Securityfor the Mortgage
Loan, 46 RUTGERs L. REv. 349 (1993).
83. Such an approach certainly would have eliminated the confusion about what

was necessary for a lender to "perfect" its security interest in rents in the bankruptcy
context. This confusion is discussed infra notes 105-124. This approach might also

have had the virtue of reducing transaction costs in some jurisdictions, to the extent
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One might object to treating rents as personal property collateral subject
to Article 9 on several grounds. First, such a change would be disruptive of
customary commercial practices and expectations. For example, treating rents
as personal property collateral would obligate those searching title to land to
look outside the land records and into the UCC filing system for pertinent
title information (the existence of an assignment of rents). Second, such a
change would create systems problems given the different operations of real
and personal property filing systems - compare, for example, the effectively
unlimited duration of a recorded and uncancelled assignment of rents (necessary because mortgage debts usually have a maturity in excess of 5 years at
origination) and the maximum five-year life span of an ordinary Article 9
financing statement. These "problems," however, are red herrings. A purchaser's "due diligence" investigation in a commercial real estate transaction
already commonly includes a search of the Article 9 records, as commercial
real estate transactions commonly include the transfer of (or creation of a
security interest in) some personal property located on or related to the land.
Further, Article 9 has already incorporated rules for extending the duration of
financing statements
where the standard 5-year period of effectiveness is
84
insufficient.
In reality, the telling objection to treating rents as Article 9 collateral is
political. Experience suggests treating rents as personal property collateral is
unlikely to obtain traction in law reform circles. In 1958, the drafters of Article 9 excluded assignments of leases and rents from Article 9's scope, ostensibly to avoid objections from the real estate bar and to facilitate the Article
9's nationwide enactment.8 5 Revised Article 9, which became effective in
July 2001, retained this exclusion - and at this point, there appears to be little
impetus for further revision to Article 9.86 Thus, even though treating rents as
personal property collateral may provide the cleanest and most coherent solution to the classification dilemma, the UARA's drafting committee chose to
leave rents within the domain of real estate law.
b. A Broader Definition of Rents as Realty
The Restatement (Third) of Property - Mortgages addressed the classification dilemma by retaining the concept of "rents" as an interest in realty, but
defining the term more broadly to include "the proceeds payable by a lessee,
licensee, or other person for the right to possess, use, or occupy the real propthat filing costs for a one-page Article 9 financing statement are lower than the costs
incurred to record multi-page assignments of rents on the land records.
84. See U.C.C. § 9-515(f) (2001) (if debtor is a transmitting utility, filed financing statement remains effective until it is terminated); § 9-515(b) (financing statement
filed in connection with a public-finance transaction or a manufactured-home transaction is effective for 30 years after date of filing).
85. U.C.C. § 9-1040) (1972 text).
86. U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(13) (2001).
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erty of another."8 7 The comments to Section 4.2 emphasize the functional
nature of this definition:
The term "rents," as used in this section, encompasses also "issues
and profits" of real estate. Moreover, the definition includes not
only rents and royalties that arise out of lease relationships, but
also other proceeds that are paid primarily for the possession, occupancy, or use of real property. To the extent that a lease requires
a tenant to pay a pro-rata share of mortgagor's real estate taxes or
common area expenses, such obligations are treated as "rents."
Moreover, the definition includes hotel room charges as well as
fees generated from most parking facilities. On the other hand, the
definition does not encompass accounts receivable and other proceeds that result primarily from the sale of goods or services. Security interests in such proceeds
are solely within the purview of the
88
Uniform Commercial Code.
The primary virtue of the Restatement's definition is its functional appeal. As discussed above, the economic similarity between tenant rents and
occupancy charges paid by licensees supports a rule that would accord them
equivalent legal treatment. For example, the Restatement's functional definition would avoid the "trap for the unwary" into which numerous hotel lenders
fell in the 1980s (e.g., taking an "assignment of rents" only to have the court
conclude that hotel room charges were not "rents" at all).
Still, as its drafters conceded, the Restatement's functional definition
left residual uncertainty about the classification of some sums generated by
commercial real estate. The illustrations contained in the comments to Restatement Section 4.2 suggested that revenues paid by parking patrons in a
parking garage would constitute "rents" from the garage, s9 but that gate receipts paid by visitors to a racetrack would not constitute "rents" because they
"derive[] primarily from the entertainment provided to race track customers." 9° These examples suggested that a "land vs. services" analysis was implicit in resolving the rents/non-rents classification dilemma. Yet this
land/services distinction still leaves residual uncertainty regarding the revenues produced by such projects as golf courses, landfills, marinas, theaters
and stadia, as it appears to place the burden on courts to make case-by-case
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.2(a) (1997).
88. Id. cmt. e.
89. "Because receipts from parking patrons primarily represent fees paid for the
right to park motor vehicles on Mortgagor's real estate, they constitute rents and
Mortgagee has the right to collect them until the mortgage obligation is satisfied." Id.
cmt. f, illus. 9.
90. "Because the gate receipts are derived primarily from the entertainment
provided to race track customers, they do not constitute rents and Mortgagee has no
right to collect them." Id. cmt. f, illus. 8.

HeinOnline -- 71 Mo. L. Rev. 19 2006

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71

judgments about the extent to which occupancy revenues are "primarily"
traceable to the "use of land" as opposed to "services" provided by the operator.
At the margin, courts would face significant practical obstacles in making such judgments. 91 First, would basing the classification question upon the
land/services distinction justify or require parties to compile and analyze historical information concerning the developer's capital and operational costs in
order to characterize the revenues as "rent"? Second, the extent to which different occupiers are concerned about occupying space as opposed to receiving
services is a function of each occupier's respective preferences - but these
may differ substantially from user to user and from situation to situation. In
this respect, one might consider the greens fees generated by a golf course.
Some courses can command high greens fees only because of the significant
capital investment made by the developer to construct a challenging golf
course out of an otherwise unremarkable (and not particularly valuable) piece
of land. Other courses may command high greens fees precisely because of
the underlying characteristics of the land itself (e.g., Pebble Beach, which can
command high greens fees because of its spectacular setting). Thus, it is not
clear exactly how a court would go about determining whether greens fees
constituted "rents" under the Restatement's functional definition - and thus
the Restatement's functional definition may not provide a sufficiently clear
solution to the classification dilemma.
3. The Classification Dilemma and the UARA
The UARA adopts a two-fold strategy to address the classification dilemma. First, the UARA follows the Restatement approach of broadening the
scope of "rents," defining the term to include "sums payable for the right to
possess or occupy, or for the actual possession or occupancy of, real property
of another person."9 2 This definition would treat as "rents" sums payable by
one who has the right to occupy the real property of another in a fashion that
is essentially exclusive in nature. Thus, for example, the UARA would treat
hotel room charges as "rents," as the hotel guest's occupancy is in practical
terms exclusive - the guest's occupancy effectively prevents its enjoyment by
other third persons - even if the guest's interest does not rise to the level of a
nonfreehold estate.
As discussed above, however, this approach leaves it unclear whether
sums paid by certain users or occupiers - such as golf course greens fees or
boat slip fees - constitute rents. To address this uncertainty, the UARA takes
an indirect approach to solving the classification trap. The UARA establishes
a baseline rule that a mortgage automatically creates an assignment of rents,
91. For more detailed discussion of the difficulties presented by the land-services
distinction, see Freyermuth, Of Hotel Revenues, supra note 3, at 1512-24.

92. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, Uniform
Assignment of Rents Act § 2(12)(A) (2005) [hereinafter UARA].
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unless the mortgage itself provides otherwise. 93 In this regard, the UARA
adopts a default rule comparable to the "proceeds" rules of UCC Article 9.94
Given the economic equivalence between rents and proceeds,9 5 this default
rule makes functional sense. Furthermore, because parties to most commercial mortgage loans typically include an express assignment of rents, the
UARA's baseline rule merely captures the expected bargain of the parties to
the mortgage transaction (in the same way that Article 9's proceeds rules
reflect the presumed ex ante bargain of debtor and secured party).
As a practical matter, the UARA's default rule should enable most prudent mortgagees to moot the classification trap. For example, consider a loan
to be secured by a mortgage on a marina. Under the present approach, the
lender must make a judgment whether boat slip charges would constitute
rents or accounts and must obtain and file/record the proper documentation
depending upon that judgment. If the lender takes and records an assignment
of rents but does not obtain and perfect a security interest in accounts, the
lender is subject to the risk of an ex post determination that the slip fees are
accounts not covered by the assignment of rents. If the lender obtains and
perfects a security interest in accounts, but does not take an assignment of
rents, the lender is subject to the risk of an ex post determination that the slip
fees are rents not covered by the security agreement. To the extent that the
lender cannot resolve the residual uncertainty, the lender must both take and
record an assignment of rents and obtain and perfect a security interest in
accounts - marginally increasing the transaction costs of the loan. By contrast, under the UARA's default rule, the lender need not take and record an
express assignment of rents. The lender could take and record a mortgage on
the land and obtain and perfect a security interest in the borrower's accounts.
If the court later determines that the boat slip fees constitute "rents," the
lender's recorded mortgage on the land is sufficient to provide the lender with
93. UARA § 4(a) ("An enforceable security instrument creates an assignment of
rents arising from the real property described in the security instrument, unless the
security instrument provides otherwise.").
During the UARA drafting committee's discussions, a concern was raised
that UARA § 4(a) would essentially reject the lien theory of mortgage law. Obviously, UARA § 4(a) does not have that effect. If a lien theory state enacts UARA, a
mortgage in that state will only create a lien on the mortgaged land; it will not affect
any transfer of legal title to the land prior to foreclosure. In a lien theory state, the
enactment of UARA would only alter the law with respect to the creation of a lien on
rents - making such a lien automatic (unless the mortgage specified otherwise) rather
than requiring the granting of a separate assignment of rents. See supra notes 35-36
and accompanying text. Further, UARA § 4(a) only creates a lien on the rents as security for the mortgage debt.
94. U.C.C. §§ 9-203(f), 9-315(a)(2) (2001). It is also worth noting that this result
is also consistent with the provisions of the Uniform Land Security Interest Act,
promulgated by NCCUSL in 1985. See Uniform Land Security Interest Act §§
111(20), 210(c) & cmt. 3.
95. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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a perfected security interest in rents. In this way, the UARA will obviate the
need for (and the expense of) preparing and recording an express assignment
of rents in those cases where the classification of the property revenues is
unclear. Furthermore, by broadening the definition of "rents" and making it
clear that the "rents" are analogous to "proceeds," the UARA should increase
the likelihood that a lender's interest in post-petition occupancy revenues is
96
preserved under Bankruptcy Code § 552(b).
The UARA's baseline rule should not prove disruptive of lender and
borrower expectations in the commercial setting. First, in nearly all commercial mortgage transactions, mortgage documentation includes an express assignment of rents (either in the mortgage itself, in a separate document, or
both). Second, this new baseline rule will
not apply to mortgages signed and
97
delivered before the UARA takes effect.
The UARA's impact upon residential mortgage transactions is more nuanced. Most residential mortgage forms in current use (such as the Fannie
Mae/Freddie Mac single-family instruments) do not contain an express assignment of rents. In a title-theory state, the lack of an express assignment of
rents is not significant, as the mortgagee's legal title would permit the mortgagee 9 to collect rents after default (unless the mortgage provided otherwise). 8 But in a lien-theory state, a mortgage that does not contain an express
assignment of rents traditionally has not been viewed as creating a security
interest in rents - effectively preventing the mortgagee from obtaining control
a foreclosure or (in
of rentals from the land until the mortgagee can complete
99
exceptional cases) obtain the appointment of a receiver.
The UARA's baseline rule would change this result and grant the residential mortgagee an automatic lien upon rents (unless the mortgage provided
to the contrary). For two important reasons, however, this change should have
no negative effects on residential mortgagors. First, rents typically will not
accrue in cases where the borrower occupies the mortgaged real property as
its primary residence. This means that in the overwhelming majority of residential mortgages, any implicit assignment of rents created by the UARA will
be of no practical relevance. Second, in the rare case where rents would arise
from such property - e.g., where a mortgagor occupies the mortgaged premises as a residence but "rents out" the basement or the attic to a tenant or
boarder - the Act's remedial mechanisms for enforcing the assignee's interest
in rents by notificationl °° are not available if the assignee holds a security
interest in rents solely by virtue of the UARA's baseline rule.' 0 ' Without ob96. See supra notes 65-74 and accompanying text.
97. UARA § 19(c). Thus, already existing mortgages that do not contain an express assignment of rents will not automatically create a security interest in rents.

98. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
99. See supra notes 35-36 and accompanying text.
100. See infra parts IIB and IIIC.
101. UARA §§ 8(d), 9(g). See infra notes 191-200 (enforcement by notification to
assignor), notes 201-212 (enforcement by notification to tenants).
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taining an express assignment of rents, a residential mortgagee thus could not
obtain control over any rents actually accruing from a mortgagor-occupied
residence unless the mortgagee could demonstrate equitable circumstances
justifying the appointment of a receiver for the property. Because courts have
rarely granted receiverships for mortgagor-occupied residential real property,
the practical negative
impact of the UARA upon residential mortgages will be
02
best.'
at
minimal
In fact, by negating the documentary trap for the unwary, the UARA's
baseline rule should operate to the benefit of financing sellers of real property
- many of whom may well act without benefit of legal counsel (and thus may
fail to obtain an express assignment of rents).10 3 For example, if a seller of a
vacation home sells the home but takes back a purchase money mortgage
without an express assignment of rents, the seller could find itself in substantial difficulty if the buyer subsequently chooses to lease (rather than occupy)
the home and later files for bankruptcy. Under the UARA, the financing seller
would obtain a security interest in rents automatically (unless the mortgage
provided otherwise), and this would provide the seller with recourse to the
post-petition rents in the event of buyer's bankruptcy.
Finally, the UARA's baseline rule would also have relevance if the
United States were to adopt the United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade. Under article 4.5(a) of that Convention, the priority choice of law rules for assignments of receivables do not
affect the priority of an interest in rents under the law of the state in which the
related real property is located if under that law an interest in the real property
conveys an interest in the rents.
A state which enacts the UARA would have
4
the benefit of article 4.5(a).1
B. 'Perfection" of a Security Interest in Rents.
1. Judicial Conflation of "Perfection" and "Enforcement"
Using the bankruptcy trustee's "strong-arm" powers as expressed in
Bankruptcy Code section 544(a), a debtor-in-possession can invalidate or
"avoid" any security interest that a judgment lien creditor (as to personal
property) or a bona fide purchaser (as to non-fixture real property) could have
avoided under state law as of the petition date. 0 5 The strong-arm power permits a debtor-in-possession to invalidate an unperfected security interest in
102. E.g., Keybank Nat'l Ass'n v. Michael, 737 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000)
("A receiver may be appointed by the court. . . if, at the time the motion is filed, the
property is not occupied by the owner as the owner's principal residence...
103. UARA § 4 cmt. 1.
104. UARA § 4 cmt. 1. I am grateful to Ed Smith for highlighting the relationship
between UARA § 4(a) and article 4.5 of UNCITRAL.
105. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (2000).
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property of the bankruptcy estate. For example, if a creditor had taken a security interest in the debtor's inventory but had failed to file an Article 9 financing statement sufficient to perfect that interest, the creditor's unperfected
security interest in inventory would be subordinate under state law to the
rights of a creditor with a judgment lien against that inventory. 106 Upon the
debtor's bankruptcy filing, section 544(a) would thus permit the debtor-inpossession to exercise the rights of a lien creditor - enabling the debtor-inpossession to invalidate the creditor's unperfected security interest in the
inventory and use the proceeds of that inventory to fund its reorganization
effort.
In the 1980s and early 1990s, bankruptcy courts struggled mightily over
the impact of section 544(a) upon a mortgagee's right to post-petition rents
under an assignment of rents. This struggle primarily arose due to the confusion generated by the disparate vocabularies of mortgage law and Article 9.
Under Article 9, a secured party obtains a security interest in collateral by
07
having the debtor execute a security agreement describing that collateral,'
and "perfects" that security interest by filing an Article 9 financing statement
describing the collateral.108 By "perfecting" its security interest, the Article 9
secured party makes that interest enforceable against subsequent creditors such as lien creditors (and thus the trustee in bankruptcy). If the secured party
has a properly perfected security interest prior to the petition date, it is irrelevant whether the secured party had taken any steps to enforce that security
interest prior to bankruptcy. The perfected security interest continues to remain effective against the collateral and the debtor cannot avoid that security
interest using its strong-arm avoidance power.
By contrast, mortgage law did not customarily use the term "perfection."
Instead, real estate law focused upon "recording" - the idea that "recording" a
document on the public land records made the interest created in that document valid against subsequent creditors and bona fide purchasers. Analytically, of course, "recording" in this sense is similar to the Article 9 concept of
perfection. One could thus argue that if a mortgage lender had taken and
properly recorded an assignment of leases and rents prior to bankruptcy, the
mortgage lender's interest in rents would be generally enforceable against
third parties. Under this analysis, the debtor could not avoid the mortgage
lender's security interest in rents under section 544(a), and the mortgage
lender would retain its interest in post-petition rents under section 552(b). A
number of courts in fact adopted this analytical approach, properly treating
post-petition rents as the lender's cash collateral so long as the mortgagee had

106. U.C.C. § 9-317(a)(2) (2005) ("A security interest ... is subordinate to the
rights of... a person that becomes a lien creditor before ... the security interest.., is
perfected.").
107. Id. § 9-203(b)(3).
108. Id. § 9-310(a).

HeinOnline -- 71 Mo. L. Rev. 24 2006

2006]

UNIFORMASSIGNMENT OFRENTS

properly recorded its assignment of rents prior to bankruptcy. 109 By contrast,
numerous bankruptcy courts invalidated security interests in post-petition
rents in cases in which lenders had taken no "affirmative steps" to enforce
those interests prior to the debtor's bankruptcy petition.
To understand these decisions and how they conflated "perfection" or
"enforceability" with "enforcement," it is useful to revisit the distinction between the lien and title theory of mortgages. Under the title theory, the mortgagee held legal title to the land (and unaccrued rents) by virtue of the mortgage, even prior to default. By contrast, under the lien theory, a mortgage by
itself gave the mortgagee only a security interest in the land rather than legal
title - and thus gave the mortgagee no interest in unaccrued rents until such
time as the mortgagee completed a foreclosure, became a mortgagee in possession, or obtained the appointment of a receiver for the land."1 0 Of course, if
the mortgagee claims a security interest in rents by virtue of a separate assignment of leases and rents, then the legal constraints on the mortgagee's
implicit right to rents (i.e., by virtue of the mortgage itself) should be irrele-

vant. Nevertheless, a number of state court decisions conflated these two
situations, holding that even a separate assignment of rents was not effective
until the mortgagee took affirmative steps after default to enforce that asI
signment. The language of the Texas Supreme Court in Taylor v. Brennan II
is perhaps the best demonstration of this analysis:
Texas follows the lien theory of mortgages. Under this theory the
mortgagee is not the owner of the property and is not entitled to its
possession, rentals or profits. Thus, it has become a common practice to include in the deed of trust, or in a separate instrument,
terms assigning to the mortgagee the mortgagor's interest in all
rents falling due after the date of the mortgage as additional security for payment of the mortgage debt.
The Texas cases addressing rentals assigned as security have followed the common law rule that an assignment of rentals does not
109. O'Neal Steel, Inc. v. EB Inc. (In re Millette), 186 F.3d 638 (5th Cir. 1999);
Steinberg v. CrossLand Mortgage Corp. (In re Park at Dash Point L.P.), 985 F.2d
1008, 1011 (9th Cir. 1993); Vienna Park Props. v. United Postal Say. Ass'n (In re
Vienna Park Props.), 976 F.2d 106, 112-15 (2d Cir 1992); J.H. Streiker & Co. v. SeSide Co. (In re SeSide Co.), 152 B.R. 878, 884-85 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993); In re
Northport Marina Assocs., 136 B.R. 911, 917-18 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992); In re
White Plains Dev. Corp., 136 B.R. 93, 95 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Rancourt,
123 B.R. 143, 147 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991); In re Somero, 122 B.R. 634, 638-39
(Bankr. D. Me. 1991); In re Raleigh/Spring Forest Apts. Assocs., 118 B.R. 42, 45
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1990); Nw. Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Metro Square (In re Metro
Square), 106 B.R. 584, 587 (D. Minn. 1989).
110. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text.
111. 621 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. 1981).
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become operative until the mortgagee obtains possession of the
property, or impounds the rents, or secures the appointment of a
2
receiver, or takes some other similar action."
Based upon reasoning like that in Taylor and other state court decisions,' 13 numerous bankruptcy courts concluded that an assignment of leases
and rents created only an "inchoate" lien upon rents that was ineffective
against third parties if the mortgagee had not taken affirmative steps prior to
bankruptcy to activate that lien. As a result, these bankruptcy courts concluded that if a mortgagee had not taken action sufficient to divest the mortgagor of control over the land and its rents prior to bankruptcy - such as by
obtaining the appointment of a receiver, taking possession of the land, or
notifying tenants to begin paying rents directly to the mortgagee - the mortgagee's security interest in post-petition rents was "unperfected" and was thus
subject to avoidance under the strong-arm clause. " 4 In such a case, the debtor
was able to use post-petition rents free and clear5 of any claim by the mortgagee while the debtor remained in bankruptcy."1
112. Id. at 593-94 (emphasis added).
113. See, e.g., Bevins v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 671 P.2d 875, 879 (Alaska
1983), Martinez v. Cont'l Enters., 730 P.2d 308, 316 (Colo. 1986); Sullivan v. Rosson, 119 N.E. 405 (N.Y. 1918).
114. See, e.g., In re Century Inv. Fund VIII L.P., 937 F.2d 371, 377 (7th Cir.
1991); In re 1301 Conn. Ave. Assocs., 126 B.R. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1991); First Fed. Sav. &
Loan Ass'n v. Hunter (In re Sam A. Tisci, Inc.), 133 B.R. 857, 859 (N.D. Ohio 1991);
Condor One, Inc. v. Turtle Creek, Ltd. (In re Turtle Creek, Ltd.), 194 B.R. 267, 278
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996); In re Mews Assocs., L.P., 144 B.R. 867, 868-69 (Bankr.
W.D. Mo. 1992); Glessner v. Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. (In re Glessner), 140
B.R. 556, 562 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1992); Drummond v. Farm Credit Bank of Spokane
(In re Kurth Ranch), 110 B.R. 501, 506 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1990); In re Multi-Group
III Ltd. P'ship, 99 B.R. 5, 8 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1989); Armstrong v. United States (In re
Neideffer), 96 B.R. 241, 243 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1988); In re TM Carlton House Partners,
Ltd., 91 B.R. 349, 355-56 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988); In re Ass'n Ctr. Ltd. P'ship, 87
B.R. 142, 145 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1988); In re Prichard Plaza Assocs. Ltd. P'ship,
84 B.R. 289, 293-94 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1988); In re Hamlin's Landing Joint Venture,
77 B.R. 916, 920 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1987), superceded by statute, as stated in In re
163rd St. Mini Storage, Inc., 113 B.R. 87, 88-89 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990); Ziegler v.
First Nat'l Bank of Volga (In re Ziegler), 65 B.R. 285, 287 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1986);
Exch. Nat'l Bank v. Gotta (In re Gotta), 47 B.R. 198, 204 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1985).
115. A few courts took an intermediate position, relying upon a misapplication of
Bankruptcy Code § 546(b). During the relevant period, Section 546(b) provided as
follows:
The rights and powers of a trustee under sections 544, 545, and 549 of this
title are subject to any generally applicable law that permits perfection of
an interest in property to be effective against an entity that acquires rights
in such property before the date of such perfection. If such law requires
seizure of such property or commencement of an action to accomplish
such perfection, and such property as not been seized or such action has
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These disparate interpretations of state mortgage law produced substantial nonuniformity in the treatment of security interests in rents, both from
state to state and even from district to district within particular states. This
nonuniformity produced significant criticism among academics, real estate
practitioners, and commercial mortgage lenders." 16 This criticism prompted
Congress to amend section 552(b) in 1994 in an attempt to provide more uniform treatment of assignments of rents. Prior to 1994, section 552(b) provided that a pre-petition security interest in land and rents from that land extended to post-petition rents "to the extent provided by [the] security agreement and by applicable nonbankruptcy law.' 117 By focusing upon the term
"applicable nonbankruptcy law," many courts (as noted above) concluded
that section 552(b) did not permit the mortgagee to claim a security interest in
post-petition rents if the mortgagee had not taken sufficient steps to obtain
actual or constructive possession of the land and its rents prior to bankruptcy.
In 1994, Congress amended section 552(b) by removing this reference to
"applicable nonbankruptcy law":
Except as provided in sections 363, 506(c), 522, 544, 547, and 548
of this title, and notwithstanding section 546(b) of this title, if the
debtor and [the secured party] entered into a security agreement
before the commencement of the case and if the security interest
created by such security agreement extends to property of the
not been commenced before the date of the filing of the petition, such interest in such property shall be perfected by notice within the time fixed
by law for such seizure or commencement.
11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (1993). Several courts concluded that even if the mortgagee had
failed to take sufficient steps prior to bankruptcy to activate its assignment of rents,
section 546(b) permitted the mortgagee to give the debtor post-petition notice of its
intention to enforce its security interest in rents, thereby perfecting the mortgagee's
security interest in post-petition rents. See, e.g., Casbeer v. State Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n of Lubbock (In re Casbeer) 793 F.2d 1436, 1443 (5th Cir. 1986); Wolters Vill.,
Ltd. v. Vill. Props., Ltd. (In re Vill. Props., Ltd.), 723 F.2d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 1986);
In re Mears, 88 B.R. 419, 421 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988); McCombs Props. VI, Ltd. v.
First Tex. Say. Ass'n (In re McCombs Props. VI, Ltd.), 88 B.R. 261, 264 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1988); In re Gelwicks, 81 B.R. 445, 447-48 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1987); FDIC
v. Lancaster (In re Sampson), 57 B.R. 304, 307 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986).
116. See, e.g., Freyermuth, The Circus Continues, supra note 65, at 118; Forrester,
supra note 82; Craig H. Averch, Revisitation of the Fifth Circuit Opinions of Village
Properties and Casbeer: Is Post-Petition"Perfection" of an Assignment of Rents Necessary to Characterize Rental Income as Cash Collateral?, 93 CoM. L.J. 516 (1988);
James McCafferty, The Assignment of Rents in the Crucible of Bankruptcy, 94 COM.
L.J. 433 (1989); Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., Recognizing Lenders'Rents Interests in Bankruptcy, 27 REAL PROP., PROB. & TRUST J. 281 (1992); Glenn R. Schmitt, The Continuing

Confusion Over Real Property Rents as Cash Collateralin Bankruptcy: The Needfor a
ConsistentInterpretation,5 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 1 (1992-93).
117. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1978).
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debtor acquired before the commencement of the case and to
amounts paid as rents of such property . . ., then such security interest extends to such rents . . . acquired by the estate after the

commencement of the case to the extent provided in such security
agreement, except to any extent that the court, after notice and a
8
hearing and based on the equities of the case, orders otherwise."
Most commentators concluded that the amended section 552(b) established a federal standard for the enforcement of an assignment of rents, thus
rendering state rent assignment law irrelevant." 9 Unfortunately, while there is
legislative history suggesting that this was Congress's intent,1 20 the text itself
provides no express statement of pre-emptive intent. Further, even as
amended, section 552(b)'s protection for a security interest in post-petition
rents is expressly subject to the trustee's strong-arm power under section 544
- which implicitly incorporates underlying state law regarding the enforceability of a security interest againstthird parties.Under section 544(a), there

is no question that the debtor-in-possession may avoid a security interest in
rents if a bona fide purchaser of the land could have avoided that interest
under state law as of the petition date. Thus, if state law actuallyprovides that
a security interest in rents is ineffective against third parties until the mortgagee has taken affirmative action to enforce that security interest, section
544(a) would permit the debtor to avoid the security interest of such a mortgagee - notwithstanding section 552(b) 2as amended - if the mortgagee failed
to take such action prior to bankruptcy. 1
2. The UARA's Solution: Equating "Recording" and "Perfection."
Roughly one-third of the states have enacted statutes making clear that
an assignment of rents is perfected and effective against third persons upon its
recordation, without regard to whether the mortgagee has taken any steps to
"activate" or "enforce" that assignment. 22 Not all states have
followed suit,
118. Id. § 552(b)(2).
119. See, e.g., 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 552.03[1], at 552-20 (15th ed. revised 2001) ("[Section 552(b)(2)] does not refer to applicable nonbankruptcy law and
is intended to provide a creditor with a valid postpetition interest in rents notwithstanding the creditor's failure to perfect its security interest in rents under applicable
state law .... ").
120. 140 CONG. REC. H10768 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (statements of Rep.
Brooks).
121. Perhaps recognizing this drafting flaw, some courts faced with priority disputes regarding rents have continued to look to underlying state law "perfection"
rules, notwithstanding amended section 552(b). See, e.g., In re Millette, 186 F.3d 638
(5th Cir. 1999) (mortgagee perfected upon recording under Mississippi law).
122. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2938 (1993 & Supp. 2005) (amended 1996); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 25, § 2121 (1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 697.07 (1994); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. §

HeinOnline -- 71 Mo. L. Rev. 28 2006

2006]

UNIFORM ASSIGNMENT OF RENTS

however. To remove any lingering question regarding the enforceability of a
recorded assignment of rents, the UARA incorporates a comparable provision:
Upon recording, the security interest in rents created by an assignment of rents is fully perfected, even if a provision of the document
creating the assignment or law of this state other than this [act]
would preclude or defer enforcement of the security interest until
the occurrence of a subsequent event, including a subsequent default of the assignor, the assignee's obtaining possession of the real
23
property, or the appointment of a receiver.'
The UARA also expressly provides that a perfected security interest in
rents is entitled to priority over the rights of subsequent judicial lien24creditors
and persons thereafter purchasing an interest in the land or its rents.'

C. "Absolute" Assignments ofRents
1. The Rationale for an "Absolute" Assignment of Rents and the Elevation of Form Over Substance
Southerners are familiar with kudzu, an invasive plant that rapidly
spreads to cover trees and other native vegetation. The government initially
advocated the planting of kudzu as an erosion control measure, 25 until it became apparent that the spread of kudzu posed a major threat to the health of

5/31.5 (2001); IND. CODE ANN. § 32-21-4-2 (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2343
(1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4401 (1997); MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 3-204
(2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 52-1704 (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 47-20(c) (2003); OR.
REV. STAT. § 93.806 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 29-3-100 (1991); TENN. CODE ANN. §
66-26-116 (2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-220.1 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE §
7.28.230(3) (1992); WIS. STAT. § 708.11 (2001).
Both Michigan and New York have statutes addressing assignments of rents
that on their face do not expressly provide that an assignment of rents is "perfected"
upon recording. Nevertheless, court decisions have interpreted these statutes to establish that an assignment of rents is perfected upon recording, even without the mortgagee having taken action to enforce the assignment. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§

554.231, 554.232 (2005), interpretedin In re Mt. Pleasant Ltd. P'ship, 144 B.R. 727
(Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 294-a (1989), interpretedin In re
Fin. Ctr. Assocs. of E. Meadow, L.P., 140 B.R. 829 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992).
123. UARA § 5(b).
124. UARA § 5(c).
125. See Max Shores, The Amazing Story of Kudzu, http://www.cptr.ua.edu/kudzu
(last visited Feb. 9, 2006) ("During the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Soil Conservation Service promoted kudzu for erosion control. Hundreds of young men were given
work planting kudzu through the Civilian Conservation Corps. Farmers were paid as
much as eight dollars an acre as incentive to plant fields of the vines in the 1940s.").
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forests. 126 Until very recently, kudzu served no apparent useful purpose, 127
and is so stubborn that its eradication has proven nearly impossible.
Mortgage law has its own form of kudzu - the "absolute" assignment of
rents. As American states gradually abandoned the title theory of mortgages
in favor of lien theory, some mortgage lenders began drafting "absolute" assignments of rents in an effort to give mortgagees in lien theory states the
ostensible benefit of title theory rules. Under the language of a typical "absolute" assignment, the mortgagor purports to transfer to the mortgagee/assignee full "title" to unaccrued rents as of the execution and delivery
of the assignment. An "absolute" assignment typically will state that it is "not
merely for purposes of security." Furthermore, an "absolute" assignment will
frequently state that the borrower no longer has any interest in unaccrued
rents other than a revocable license (i.e., that the borrower no longer
has a
"property" right) to collect such rents prior to the borrower's default.' 28
Whether an assignment of rents is "absolute" or instead creates a security interest in rents makes little practical difference outside of the bankruptcy
context - the assignee's ability to collect the rents is typically defined by the
126. Id.
127. Recently, Harvard researchers reported that experimental subjects that had
taken capsules containing kudzu extract drank approximately 50% less beer in the
ensuing 90 minutes than subjects that had taken a placebo, leading to speculation that
kudzu might prove useful in curbing binge drinking. See Michael Kunzelman, Study:
Kudzu Helps Curb Binge Drinking, ABC News, May 17, 2005,
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory?id=763977.
128. A good example is the language of the assignment of rents at issue in HomeCorp. v. Secor Bank, 659 So. 2d 15, 18 (Ala. 1994), which provided as follows:
Mortgagor hereby assigns and transfers to Mortgagee all the rents, issues
and profits of the Mortgaged Property, and Hereby gives to and confers
upon the Mortgagee the right, power and authority to collect such rents,
issues and profits. Mortgagor irrevocably appoints Mortgagee its true and
lawful attorney-in-fact at the option of Mortgagee at any time and from
time to time, to demand, receive and enforce payment, to give receipts, releases and satisfactions, and to sue, in the name of the Mortgagor or

Mortgagee, for any such rents, issues and profits and provided, however,
that Mortgagor shall have the right to collect such rents, issues and profits
(but not more than two months in advance) prior to or at any time there is
not notice of an event of default under this Mortgage, the Note, the Loan

Agreement and a guaranty of such documents and any other instruments
given as evidence to further secure the payment and performance of any
obligation secured by this Mortgage (which documents collectively are
sometimes hereinafter referred to as "Loan Instruments"). The assignment
of the rents, issues and profits of the Mortgaged Property in this Article II
is intended to be an absolute assignment from the Mortgagor to the Mortgagee and not merely the passing of a security interest. The rents, issues

and profits are hereby assigned absolutely by Mortgagor to Mortgagee
contingent only upon the occurrence of an uncured event of default under
any of the Loan Instruments.
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terms of the assignment, and in any event the assignee must apply any collected rents to the mortgage debt. However, a mortgage lender's primary objective in taking an "absolute" assignment of rents is to attempt to improve its
position in the event of the mortgagor's bankruptcy. When a debtor files for
bankruptcy, all of the property in which the debtor holds an interest becomes
property of the bankruptcy estate. 29 The debtor generally may use property of
the estate in the course of its bankruptcy proceeding, subject to the obligation to
provide adequate protection to a secured creditor holding a lien upon that property (assuming that secured creditor requests adequate protection of its lien).
Moreover, a secured party holding a security interest in property of the estate is
subject to the automatic stay and cannot seek to enforce its lien or otherwise
collect the debt outside the context of the bankruptcy proceeding. 3 ' A debtor
that owns commercial land thus has a substantial incentive to argue that postpetition rents generated by the land constitute property of the estate. By contrast, the mortgagee/assignee would prefer that the law characterize the rents as
property that is not part of the estate. If the land's post-petition rents are not
the mortproperty of the estate, the automatic stay would place no limit upon
2
debt.'
the
to
them
apply
and
rents
those
collect
to
gagee's ability
Obviously, if a mortgagee has already completed a foreclosure sale prior
to the debtor's bankruptcy filing, then the land and unaccrued rents would belong to the foreclosure purchaser and would no longer constitute property of the
bankruptcy estate. But if the mortgagee has not yet completed a foreclosure sale
- and thus equitable ownership of the land remains in the debtor - unaccrued
post-petition rents fit squarely within the Code's broad concept of "property of
the estate." Mortgage lenders have frequently argued, however, that if a mortgagor executed an "absolute" assignment of rents, then title to the unaccrued
post-petition rents has passed to the lender and those rents thus do not constitute property of the bankruptcy estate. Adopting the lenders' argument would
permit the mortgagee to collect post-petition rents from the land without regard
to the automatic stay, and would thus substantially increase the mortagagee's
practical leverage over the debtor. A significant number of bankruptcy court
decisions have validated this practice, holding that where a bankrupt mortgagor

129. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000).
130. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2000 & Supp. 2005).
131. Id. § 362(a).
132. Such a characterization would be particularly important in a case where a
mortgage loan is undersecured (i.e., where the unpaid balance of the mortgage debt
exceeds the value of the land), because of the Timbers case, in which the Supreme Court
held that an undersecured creditor is not entitled to collect interest upon the debt during
the pendency of the bankruptcy case. United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest, 484 U.S. 365 (1988). If post-petition rents do not constitute property of the estate, then the undersecured lender could collect net post-petition rentals and apply them
to reduce the unsecured portion of its claim on a dollar-for-dollar basis, thereby improving its total recovery vis-a-vis the debtor's other unsecured creditors.
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had executed an "absolute" assignment of rents prior to bankruptcy, postpetition rents do not constitute property of the estate. 133
The extent to which the rhetoric associated with "absolute" assignments
of rents can poison decisionmaking is most vividly demonstrated by a trilogy
of Third Circuit decisions. The first is the 1993 decision in Commerce Bank
v. Mountain View Village, Inc.134 In Mountain View, when the owner of an
apartment complex defaulted on its mortgages, the mortgagees began collecting rents directly from tenants by notifying the tenants to pay the mortgagees.
Subsequently, the mortgagor filed for bankruptcy and sought to use the postpetition rentals generated by the complex in its reorganization plan. The
mortgagees objected that the rents did not constitute property of the estate
because the mortgagees had already enforced their respective interests in the
rents by collection prior to the mortgagor's bankruptcy. The bankruptcy court
ruled that the mortgagor retained an equitable interest in the rents and that
this equitable interest was property of the bankruptcy estate. The district court
reversed this ruling, and the Third Circuit affirmed, concluding that the mortgagor retained no equitable interest in the post-petition rents. In reaching this
conclusion, the Third Circuit relied upon its interpretation of Pennsylvania
law, based upon Pennsylvania's adherence to the title theory of mortgages:
The stipulated facts conclusively establish that the banks are the
holders of mortgages that contain assignments of rents conditioned
upon default, that the debtor did default, and that, after notifying
the tenants, the banks collected the rents. Under Pennsylvania law,
it is clear that the banks were legally entitled to take the steps they
did when the debtor was unable to cure the default. Therefore, the
rents are not property of the debtor's estate and are not available
for use in a plan of reorganization....

133. First Fid. Bank v. Jason Realty, L.P. (In re Jason Realty, L.P.), 59 F.3d 423
(3d Cir. 1995); Robin Assocs. v. Metro. Bank & Trust Co. (In re Robin Assocs.), 275
B.R. 218 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2001); In re Kingsport Ventures, L.P., 251 B.R. 841
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000); In re Carretta, 220 B.R. 203 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1998); Condor
One, Inc. v. Turtle Creek, Ltd. (In re Turtle Creek), 194 B.R. 267 (Bankr. N.D. Ala.
1996); D.N.J. 1995); First Fid. Bank v. Eleven Hundred Metroplex Assocs., 190 B.R.
510 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995); MacArthur Executive Assocs. v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
190 B.R. 189 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1995); In re Carter, 126 B.R. 811 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1991); In re Galvin, 120 B.R. 767 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1990); In re Gould, 78 B.R. 590
(Bankr. D. Idaho 1987); In re Fry Rd. Assocs., 64 B.R. 808 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1986);
In re P.M.G. Props., 55 B.R. 864 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985). See also NCNB Tex.
Nat'l Bank v. Sterling Projects, Inc., 789 S.W.2d 358 (Tex. App. 1990) ("The absolute assignment does not create a security interest but instead passes title to the rents.
An absolute assignment of rents is not security but is a pro tanto payment of the obligation."); 801 Nolana, Inc. v. RTC Mortgage Trust 1994-S6, 944 S.W.2d 751 (Tex.
App. 1997) (same).
134. 5 F.3d 34 (3rd Cir. 1993).
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In the case here, the district court held that the banks would prevail
even if the mortgages were considered to be security interests
rather than transfers of title. We need not determine that issue because the facts and prevailing Pennsylvania law establish that the
banks had the right to enter the property, constructively as well as
actually, and to collect the rents. We find no indication that Pennsylvania has veered from its longstanding
title theory to one treat1 35
ing mortgages as security interests.
This passage reflects a rather shocking misapprehension of what the title
theory of mortgages actually means. There's a good reason that it's called the
title theory of mortgages - it's a theory of mortgage law. The conveyance of
title may be a conveyance of title, but for the purpose of securing a debt.

Thus, when the mortgagees collected the pre-petition rents and applied them
to the debt consistent with the terms of the loan documents, the mortgagees
were acting consistent with mortgage law. Once the rents were "collected"
and applied to reduce the debt, this extinguished the mortgagor's interest in
those collected rents. But the Mountain View court wrongly applied the same
reasoning to the post-petition rents, which had neither accrued nor been collected by the mortgagee as of the petition date. Properly viewed, the mortgagor's interest in those rents was not extinguished - even under the title theory
- simply because the mortgagees held "title" to the rents. This title was still
held only to secure the mortgage debt. Had the mortgagor paid off the mortgage debt, the mortgagee's "title" in not-yet-accrued rents would have been
extinguished along with the mortgagee's "title" to the mortgaged land.
Nevertheless, two years later, in In re Jason Realty, L.P.,136 the Third
Circuit faced a similar factual dispute - and made a similar analytical mistake
- regarding a New Jersey office building. Although New Jersey follows the
lien theory, the Third Circuit concluded that the lien theory/title theory distinction made no difference, because the mortgage documentation included an
absolute assignment of rents that had effected a transfer of "title" to the rents:
An absolute assignment transfers title to the assignee upon its execution. An assignment is absolute if its language demonstrates an
intent to transfer immediately the assignor's rights and title to the
rents. The instant assignment was quintessentially absolute, because it was a total assignment in per verba de praesenti: Jason
Realty "hereby grants, transfers and assigns to the assignee the entire lessor's interest in and to those certain leases... Together with
all rents." These parties mutually agreed in words of the present to

135. Id. at 38-39 (citations omitted).
136. 59 F.3d 423 (3rd Cir. 1995).
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transfer full title to the rents. This exchange inescapably and
un37
ambiguously expressed an agreement to assign present title.'
Again, the court's ruling is an astonishing misconstruction of mortgage
law. Essentially, the court concluded that an assignment of rents executed in
conjunction with a mortgage transaction effected a true sale of rents arising
from the mortgaged property, simply because the parties called it an "absolute
assignment." Yet the assignment was not a true sale, as evidenced by the fact
(among many others) that the terms of the assignment required the application of the rents to the mortgage debt. Just because a mortgagee in a lien theory state tries to contract itself into the position it would enjoy in a title theory
state does not make the transaction any less a mortgage transaction.
Finally, just this past July, the Third Circuit decided Sovereign Bank v.
Schwab, 138 which involved three commercial rental properties in Pennsylvania subject to a mortgage held by Sovereign Bank. Apparently, following
the mortgagor's default, Sovereign Bank first notified tenants to begin paying
rents to it. Shortly thereafter, Sovereign Bank was appointed as a receiver for
the properties. For approximately four months, Sovereign Bank collected
rents as a receiver, until the county sheriff conducted a foreclosure sale 13at9
which "the mortgaged properties were sold to [Sovereign Bank] for coSt.'
Shortly after the foreclosure, the mortgagor filed for bankruptcy and the
bankruptcy trustee sued Sovereign Bank for turnover of the rents it had collected as a receiver. [Regrettably, the facts do not indicate how much Sovereign Bank had collected in rentals, and whether it had actually applied those
rentals against the mortgage debt or whether it was still holding the accumulated rents.] The bankruptcy court ruled in favor of the trustee, and the district
court affirmed. The Third Circuit reversed, however, holding that under
Mountain View, Sovereign Bank held "title" to the rents and that40 the rents it
had collected were not property of the estate subject to turnover.
Schwab is either an unexceptional case or a gross misapplication of
mortgage law. Unfortunately, the court's incomplete statement of the facts
makes it impossible to say which. The problem is the court's cryptic statement that Sovereign Bank purchased the mortgaged properties at foreclosure
"at cost." Benignly, this could mean that Sovereign Bank purchased the
mortgaged premises for an amount equal to its appraised value but less than
the mortgage debt - in which case Sovereign Bank would have been undersecured, and properly could have (and perhaps did) apply the collected rents to
this deficiency amount. Equally benignly, Sovereign Bank might have applied all of the collected rents to reduce the mortgage debt prior to foreclosure, and then might have made a full credit bid (thereby extinguishing the
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id. at 427 (citations omitted).
414 F.3d 450 (3rd Cir. 2005).
Id. at 452.
Id. at 453.
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debt). Both of these results are fully consistent with a correct application of
mortgage law. However, the court's cryptic language leaves open the possibility that Sovereign Bank made a full credit bid at the same time that it was
also holding a pool of rents that it had collected as a receiver but had not yet
applied to the debt. If those are the facts, then Sovereign Bank's full credit
bid should have extinguished the mortgage debt and Sovereign Bank's "title"
to the pool of collected rents - even under the title theory, the mortgagee's
"title" still only secures the mortgage debt. Under that scenario, the proper
decision would have been that the collected rents still belonged to the mortgagor and became property of the bankruptcy estate.
2. The UARA and the Elevation of Substance Over Form
Most commentators have rejected the "absolute" assignment of rents
(and the "analysis" reflected in the Third Circuit's case law) as pure form
over substance - and properly so, given the context of the typical commercial
mortgage transaction. 4 1 The typical "absolute" assignment of rents is only a
security device, as is evident from the circumstances surrounding the typical
"absolute" assignment. These circumstances include the facts that (a) the
assignment is executed contemporaneously with a mortgage, (b) the mortgagor may collect and dispose of rents prior to default, (c) the assignee typically
may not collect rents prior to default, even though the assignment might
nominally characterize such rents as the assignee's "property," and (d) the
assignment requires that any rents collected by the assignee be applied to the
mortgage indebtedness. These circumstances demonstrate clearly that the
parties intend for the assignment of rents to secure the mortgagor's obligation
to repay the mortgage debt - the "absolute" assignment is merely a security
device despite its "absolute" label.
Mortgage law has long established that instruments purporting to convey absolute title to land nevertheless create only equitable liens if the circumstances demonstrate that the parties are using title to land to secure payment of a debt. 142 Under this same principle, a court should re-characterize
the typical "absolute" assignment of rents as an assignment for security

141. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.2 Reporters'
Note (1997) ("The use of 'absolute assignment' terminology . . . creates needless
confusion and is rejected .... ").
142. See, e.g., id. § 3.2 (absolute deed intended to secure an obligation constitutes
a mortgage); Smith v. Player, 601 So. 2d 946 (Ala. 1992) (same); Steckelberg v.
Randolph, 404 N.W.2d 144 (Iowa 1987) (same). This is likewise consistent with
U.C.C. Article 9, under which (generally speaking) any transaction that creates an
interest in personal property to secure payment or performance of an obligation constitutes a security transaction (and not an outright transfer), regardless of its form.
U.C.C. §§ 1-201(b)(35), 9-109(a)(1).
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purposes, and the weight of modem judicial authority so provides. 143 Under
this view, where the mortgagee has not taken sufficient steps to enforce its
security interest prior to bankruptcy, post-petition rents would constitute
property of the bankruptcy estate.
Consistent with this approach, the UARA rejects the notion that an assignment of rents executed in the context of a mortgage transaction constitutes an "absolute" assignment. The UARA defines an "assignment of rents"
as "a transfer of an interest in rents in connection with an obligation secured
by real property located in this state and from which the rents arise."' 44 The
UARA further provides that any assignment of rents creates only a security
interest in rents, regardless
of whether the agreement is in the form of an ab45
solute assignment.

143. In re 5877 Poplar, L.P., 268 B.R. 140 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2001); Carvos v.
Fleet Nat'l Bank (In re Cavros), 262 B.R. 206 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2001); In re Guardian
Realty Group, L.L.C., 205 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1997); CS First Boston Mortgage
Capital Corp. v. RV Centennial P'ship (In re RV Centennial P'ship), 202 B.R. 774
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1996); Lyons v. Fed. Sav. Bank (In re Lyons), 193 B.R. 637, 644
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1996); Nat'l Operating, L.P. v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York, 630
N.W.2d 116 (Wis. 2001).
144. UARA § 2(2). This definition would not encompass an assignment of rents
that was made outside the context of a mortgage transaction. However, assignment of
rents that are intended as security inevitably are made in the context of a mortgage
transaction.
Technically, there is no legal barrier to prevent a landlord from making a true
sale of rents (in the same sense that a seller of goods on credit or a provider of services
can make a true sale of accounts receivable). One could view the transfer by sale of a
fee simple absolute as an effective "true sale" of future rents. The UARA drafting committee received one anecdotal report from a lawyer who reported that his landlord client
regularly "factored" his rents. If a landlord executed a document that purported to be
(and in substance was) an outright sale of rents, and this document was not executed in
the context of a mortgage transaction, the document would not effect an "assignment of
rents" within the meaning of UARA, and UARA would not apply to it. By contrast, if a
landlord executed a document that purported to be an outright sale of rents, but did so in
the context of a mortgage transaction, the document would effect an "assignment of
rents" under UARA and would create only a security interest in the rents. With respect
to the rights of the assignee versus conflicting interests, this result is consistent with the
treatment of accounts receivable under Article 9. See U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(35) (2001)
("security interest" includes "any interest of a ...buyer of accounts, chattel paper, a
payment intangible, or a promissory note in a transaction that is subject to Article 9");
id. § 9-109(a)(3) (Article 9 "applies to... a sale of accounts, chattel paper, payment
intangibles, or promissory notes"); § 9-318(b) (deemed security interest created by sale
of accounts must be perfected to make it effective as against creditors of the seller).
145. UARA § 4(b) ("An assignment of rents creates a presently effective security
interest in all accrued and unaccrued rents arising from the real property described in
the document creating the assignment, regardless of whether the document is in the
form of an absolute assignment, an absolute assignment conditioned upon default, an
assignment as additional security, or any other form.").
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D. Rents Accruing Priorto Foreclosure: "Separate" Collateral,or
"Subsumed Within the Land"?
As discussed earlier, most disputes regarding security interests in rents
are resolved in bankruptcy proceedings, with the debtor and the mortgagee
fighting to control post-petition rents. In a series of cases during the 1990s,
several bankruptcy decisions explored whether a mortgagee's interest in postpetition rents constituted "separate" collateral or was instead "subsumed"
within the land. 146 To see why this distinction might matter, one must appreciate the Bankruptcy Code's provisions regarding the debtor's ability to use
encumbered property of the estate.
If a creditor has an unavoidable security interest in collateral, the Code
ostensibly prevents the debtor from using the collateral over the creditor's
objection, unless the debtor can provide the creditor with "adequate protection" of its interest in the collateral 147 or (in the case of rents or proceeds of
collateral) unless the court concludes that the "equities of the case" otherwise
justify the debtor's use. 148 As a result, when the owner of a commercial land
development seeks bankruptcy protection, the mortgagee (assuming it holds
an assignment of rents) typically files an immediate motion seeking to prohibit the debtor's use of rents or to sequester the rents in a separate account
outside the debtor's control. The mortgagee's position is that the assignment
of rents creates a security interest in the rents in addition to the mortgage lien
on the underlying land - and thus that the debtor should have to provide adequate protection of the mortgagee's interest in rents in addition to adequate
protection of the mortgagee's interest in the land. By contrast, the
debtor/mortgagor may argue that because the rents arise from the land, the
debtor should be able to use the rents for its own purposes as long as it can
provide adequate protection of the mortgagee's interest in the land.
The proper resolution of this issue has profound consequences for the
parties to the commercial mortgage. This is especially true for an undersecured mortgagee (where the value of the mortgaged premises is less than the
mortgage debt). If the rents and the land are distinct sources of collateral, then
the mortgagee's total secured position (the value of the land plus accrued
post-petition rents) would increase during the pendency of the bankruptcy
146. For a detailed discussion of these cases, see Freyermuth, The Circus Continues, supra note 65.
147. For noncash collateral, a secured creditor must file a motion with the bankruptcy court seeking adequate protection of its interest in order to condition or prohibit the debtor's use of the collateral. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(1), 363(e) (2000). For cash
collateral (including rents), the burden shifts to the debtor to obtain either the secured
party's consent or the bankruptcy court's approval for such use in advance. Id. §

363(c)(2).
148. Under Bankruptcy Code § 552(b)(2), the bankruptcy court retains the authority to limit a lender's security interest in post-petition rents, after notice and a hearing,
based upon the "equities of the case." Id. § 552(b)(2).
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case as post-petition rents accrue. Over time, this accrual could reduce - and
perhaps even eliminate - the undersecured portion of the mortgagee's claim.
This view, of course, has profoundly negative consequences for the
debtor/mortgagor. First, it would effectively increase the amount that the
debtor must devote to satisfying the mortgagee's claim under its Chapter 11
plan.149 Second, if post-petition rents are distinct from the land, the Code's
adequate protection standards would make it difficult for the debtor to use
accrued post-petition rents to fund its reorganization efforts and expenses.Iso
In an attempt to retain greater control over post-petition rents, numerous
mortgagors advanced the theory that adequate protection of a mortgagee's
interest in rents is unnecessary because rents are "subsumed" in the land. This
hypothesis was based upon the assumption that the value of land at a particular point in time already reflects - indeed, is a mathematical function of- the
value of net rentals that will accrue in the future. To the extent that a mortgagee's secured claim is measured by the value of the land on the petition
date,' 5 that value already "subsumes" all post-petition rentals. As a result, the
hypothesis goes, it is inappropriate to treat post-petition rents as collateral that
is distinct from the land itself. Under this approach, the mortgagee's security
interest in the land (and its future rents) remains "adequately protected" so
149. Because the Timbers decision, United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest, 484 U.S. 365 (1988), mandates that an undersecured creditor may not
collect pendency interest on the secured portion of its claim, the total size of the
mortgagee's total claim would not change during the bankruptcy case. Nevertheless,
the secured and unsecured proportions of that claim would change - the secured portion would increase and the unsecured portion would decrease - as net post-petition
rents accrued. Once the debtor gains confirmation of its Chapter 11 plan, the
debtor/mortgagor must effectively pay 100% of the mortgagee's secured claim - and
with interest, if the debtor does not pay the claim in cash at confirmation. In the typical Chapter 11 plan, however, the debtor/mortgagor does not pay 100% of the mortgagee's unsecured claim, and further does not pay interest on unsecured claims. As a
result, to the extent that the accrual of post-petition rents increases the mortgagee's
secured claim, it also effectively increases the total resources that the debtor must
devote to repayment of the mortgagee's claims.
150. 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2), 363(e) (2000) (debtor cannot use cash collateral without
consent of secured party or court approval; court must prohibit/condition use of cash
collateral as necessary in order to adequately protect secured party's interest). Section
361 provides that adequate protection can take the form of cash payments, a replacement lien upon other collateral (to compensate for the depreciation/exhaustion of the
collateral being used), or any other form of relief that provides the creditor with the
"indubitable equivalent" of its interest in the collateral. Id. § 361. If the secured creditor's claim is oversecured (i.e., if the value of the land exceeds the balance of the debt),
then this equity cushion may provide adequate protection for the use of post-petition
rents. See DAVID G. EPSTEIN, STEVE H. NICKLES & JAMES J. WHITE, BANKRUPTCY § 327, at 147 (1993). In many cases, however - particularly single-asset real estate cases
where the debtor has no source of cash flow other than project rents - the adequate
protection standard will be insurmountable where the mortgage is undersecured.
151. Timbers, 484 U.S. 365.
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long as the land itself is not declining in value - even if the debtor/mortgagor
consumes all of the rents that accrue during the pendency of the bankruptcy
case. As a result, mortgagors have argued that because the mortgagee bears
the burden of proving that it lacks adequate protection, bankruptcy courts
should presumptively allow a debtor/mortgagor to use post-petition rents
without regard to the mortgagee's assignment of rents, absent sufficient proof
that the mortgaged land is declining in value.
A number of bankruptcy courts adopted this view to justify disencumbering post-petition rents. The most representative decision was In re
Mullen.15 2 The debtor in Mullen owned several parcels of land (with an aggregate value of $2.84 million) subject to mortgages and assignments of rents
in favor of BayBank, securing a total debt of $3.5 million. Following the
debtor's petition, BayBank sought relief from the automatic stay to foreclose
the mortgages; sought adequate protection of its security interest in the rents;
and moved for an order requiring the debtor to turn over or segregate net
rentals. The bankruptcy court denied BayBank's motion, concluding that
because the value of the parcels themselves was not declining, BayBank's
security interest in the rents was by definition adequately protected - even if
the debtor consumed a month's worth of net post-petition rents without a
corresponding reduction in the mortgage debt. The court explained:
BayBank says the value of its interest in the Debtor's property declines each time the Debtor consumes a month's rent in its operations. That is not so. Although BayBank loses its security interest
in each month's rents as the rents are consumed, BayBank retains
its security interest in all future rents. The value of that stream of
future rents is not declining. The lien on each month's rents replaces the lien on the prior month's rents, so there is a replacement
lien of equal value, within the meaning of section 361.153
To bolster its conclusion, the Mullen court drew an analogy between
rents and the proceeds of receivables and inventory. The court argued that as
contrasted with other cash collateral like a certificate of deposit - which
would not be automatically replaced if consumed by the debtor - "[r]ents and
receivable proceeds ... constantly renew themselves."' 4 Mullen thus concluded that "[s]o long as the debtor is not operating at a loss, or rents are not
declining, the renewals provide constant value" and that BayBank's security
interest was thus adequately protected. 55 To the Mullen court, the conclusion
that "rents are subsumed in the land" followed logically from the premises
implicit in valuation of commercial real estate:
152.
153.
154.
155.

172 B.R. 473 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994).
Id. at 476.
Id. at 478.
Id. at 478, 481.
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The value of the Debtor's properties is. . . based upon their rental
incomes. As a result, so too is the value of BayBank's mortgage interest. It is thus impossible to arrive at a value of BayBank's interest in rents which is independent of the value of its mortgage interest. The value of that mortgage interest is not declining because
rents are not declining. Consumption of those rents in the Debtor's
real estate operations has no adverse effect upon the mortgage
value. 156
The decision in Mullen (and other court decisions adopting the "rents
are subsumed within the land" hypothesis) was correct to suggest that an income-approach valuation of commercial real estate implicitly "subsumes"
unaccrued rents. However, this observation does not justify a conclusion that
a security interest in rents is wholly "subsumed" within an adequately protected mortgage lien.
It is true that a foreclosure sale purchaser - who has no claim against
rents already accrued and collected prior to sale - would establish its bid
based upon the expected stream of unaccrued rents. But the very purpose of
the assignment of rents is to provide the lender with a claim against rents that
accrue prior to foreclosure (or, in the bankruptcy context, during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding while the mortgagee remains subject to
the automatic stay). As other courts have correctly recognized, these accumulated revenues would not be factored into a valuation of the land. 157 Second,
the Mullen court's conclusion fails to take account of the impact of the notorious Timbers decision, which held that the debtor's obligation to provide
"adequate protection" of a secured creditor's mortgage did not obligate the
debtor to pay interest on the debt during the pendency of the bankruptcy case.
To the extent that Timbers creates a "gap" between the value of the claim
156. Id. at 478.
157. As Judge Leif Clark has observed:
The way appraisers value real property further supports [the observation
that an assignment of rents confers rights that have discrete value apart
from the mortgage] ....
[There are] three general approaches appraisers
use to value real property (income, comparable sales, and replacement
cost). No one approach by itself yields the true value of the property. Income-producing property is not merely worth the present value of a net
income stream. Current real estate market conditions and the cost of construction also must be taken into account....
What appraisers are valuing (or predicting) is what someone would be
willing to pay to own the property and enjoy its fruits. The income approach measures the ability of the property to produce a return on investment (via an income stream) that would justify a buyer's paying the indicated market value to own the property. The right to specific rents prior to
ownership of the property, conferred by an assignment of rents, is a priori
not calculated into this value.
In re Landing Assocs., Ltd., 122 B.R. 288, 296-97 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
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evidenced by the mortgage debt and the value of the mortgaged premises, 5 8
an assignment of rents effectively helps to close that gap by providing the
mortgagee with recourse to rents that accrue during the pendency of bankruptcy, while the mortgagee remains subject to the automatic stay. Finally,
the Mullen court's rationale fails to account for the fact that rents from commercial real estate projects do not "constantly renew themselves" automatically. A commercial real estate development is a capital asset with a limited
economic life. As a project ages, functional and economic obsolescence diminish its revenue-generating capacity, and it will not continue to generate
returns consistent with historical expectations (i.e., rents that "constantly renew themselves") absent a new capital investment to infuse the project with a
new productive capacity. In this regard, some portion of project rents reflects
158. The impact of Timbers compromises the Mullen court's observation that the
value of BayBank's mortgages followed inexorably from the value of the projects'
rental streams. Because BayBank's mortgages were undersecured - and because
BayBank accordingly could not collect interest on the debt during the pendency of
bankruptcy - one would have to discount the value of BayBank's mortgages (i.e.,
discount it from the fair market value of the mortgaged parcels) in order to account
for the expected time period during which the debtor would remain in bankruptcy
(and during which the purchaser would not be collecting interest on the debt). In other
words, a buyer purchasing BayBank's mortgages would pay less to acquire those
mortgages than it would have paid to acquire the mortgaged parcels themselves (and
the future rent streams). For an undersecured mortgagee in bankruptcy - thanks to
Timbers - the economic value of its claim based upon the mortgage debt must of
necessity be less than the economic value of the mortgaged parcel.
As a result, an assignment of rents plainly offers a source of collateral that is
separate and distinct from that offered by the mortgage itself. The very purpose of the
assignment of rents is to provide the mortgagee/assignee with security in rents accruing prior to the mortgagee's foreclosure (and potential acquisition of project ownership). To the extent that Timbers creates a "gap" between the value of the claim evidenced by the mortgage debt and the value of the mortgaged premises, an assignment
of rents effectively helps to close that gap by providing the mortgagee with recourse
to rents that accrue during the pendency of bankruptcy (while the mortgagee remains
subject to the automatic stay).
A few courts have wrongly concluded that Timbers established a general
principle that a secured creditor's secured position could not improve during the
pendency of the bankruptcy, and have thus held that a court should exclude postpetition rents from the valuation of the mortgagee's secured claim. See, e.g., In re Embassy Props. N. Ltd. P'ship, 196 B.R. 172 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1996); In re Kalian, 169
B.R. 503 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1994); In re Reddington/Sunarrow Ltd., 119 B.R. 809
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1990). The sounder view is that post-petition rents properly increase
the undersecured mortgagee's overall secured position during the pendency of the
bankruptcy case. See, e.g., Beal Bank, S.S.B. v. Waters Edge Ltd. P'ship, 248 B.R.
668 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2000); Homestead Partners, Ltd. v. Condor One, Inc. (In re
Homestead Partners, Ltd.), 200 B.R. 274 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996); In re Union Meeting Partners, 178 B.R. 664 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); In re Columbia Office Assocs.,
175 B.R. 199 (Bankr. D. Md. 1994); In re Landing Assocs., Ltd., 122 B.R. at 296-97.
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the proceeds of the exhaustion of the development's productive capacity over
time. 159

To the extent that Mullen and comparable bankruptcy decisions could be
read to rely upon state law to support the "rents are subsumed within the
land" hypothesis, the UARA rejects those decisions and establishes that a
security interest in rents is "separate and distinct" from any mortgage lien
upon the land from which the rents arise.' 60 By rejecting the "rents are subsumed within the land" hypothesis, the UARA should increase the likelihood
that the mortgagee's interest in rents will be accorded the appropriate protection in bankruptcy.
It is worth noting, however, that a state's adoption of the UARA does
not necessarily mean that a bankrupt mortgagor would be unable to use postpetition rentals if it could not provide adequate protection of the mortgagee's
security interest in collected post-petition rentals. The Bankruptcy Code permits the court to allow the debtor to use post-petition rentals as appropriate
"based on the equities of the case."' 161 As I have suggested previously, this
section should permit a court to allow the debtor to use post-petition rentals to
pay post-petition expenses of operating the real property - thus facilitating
the debtor's operations in bankruptcy and the debtor's ability to attempt to
reorganize its financial affairs - so long as the debtor's expenditures also
include an appropriate capital reserve to account for the fact that the debtor's
post-petition use exhausts some portion of the property's economic useful
life.162

III. THE UARA AND THE COLLECTION OF RENTS
When an assignee of rents attempts to enforce its security interest in
rents or actually collects rents, a number of issues can arise in addition to the
issues described in Part II. These issues include (a) what evidentiary showing
an assignee must make in order to obtain the appointment of a receiver to
collect rents; 163 (b) the mortgagor's liability for "milking" rents (i.e., collecting rents after default without directing them to the payment of the mortgage
debt);' 64 (c) what rights the assignee may have to collect rents via direct notification to tenants (and whether a tenant that pays the assignor faces the risk
of double liability);165 (d) whether a mortgagee that collects rents has any
legal duty to apply those rents to the payment of taxes and other property-

159. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
160. UARA § 4(b).
161. 11 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (2000).
162. See Freyermuth, The Circus Continues, supra note 65, at 128-33.
163. See infra notes 171-190 and accompanying text.
164. See infra notes 191-200 and accompanying text.
165. See infra notes 201-212 and accompanying text.
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related expenses;'66 (e) priority among competing assignments of rents;167 (f)
priority between an assignee of rents and a person holding an Article 9 security interest in money or other personal property that also constitutes proceeds
of rents covered by the UARA;1 68 (g) whether the assignee's collection of
rents renders the assignee a "mortgagee in possession";169 and (h) the effect
of the mortgagee's collection of rents upon the mortgagee's ability to enforce
the mortgage debt.170 Part III discusses prevailing law with respect to each of
these issues, and highlights the manner in which the UARA would resolve
each.
A. Standardsfor the Appointment of a Receiver.
In many states, mortgagees often seek to enforce an assignment of rents
by petitioning the court to appoint a receiver for the mortgaged real property
pending foreclosure. There are several reasons why receivership has often
been a preferred means of enforcing an assignment of rents. First, as discussed in Part IIB, many courts have concluded that obtaining a receiver was
one of the only steps by which a mortgagee could unmistakably perfect or
activate its assignment of rents. 17 Second, by obtaining a receiver, a mortgagee can enforce its assignment of rents without incurring the potential liabilities associated with becoming a "mortgagee in possession."' 7 2 Third,
because appointment of a receiver typically requires a court order, any uncertainties over the operation of the mortgaged premises can be resolved either
by reference to state law authorizing the appointment of a receiver or to the
court order appointing that receiver.
Unfortunately, while courts in all states have the unquestioned equitable
discretion to appoint a receiver, few states have statutes that establish individual or comprehensive standards to guide a court's exercise of that discretion. In states without such statutes, there is a great deal of variation in court
opinions regarding the circumstances under which appointment of a receiver
166. See infra notes 213-223 and accompanying text.
167. See infra notes 224-232 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 233-245 and accompanying text.
169. See infra notes 246-250 and accompanying text.
170. See infra notes 251-255 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 105-121 and accompanying text. As discussed in Part IIB,
the enactment of UARA would clarify that recording of an assignment of rents would
be sufficient to perfect that interest in rents.
172. This responsibility includes potential personal liability in tort for injuries
resulting from the mortgagee's operation of the land and by reason of the mortgagee's
failure to perform duties imposed by law upon landowners. See, e.g., NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 4.26, at 228. This responsibility also includes a strict duty
to account to the mortgagor for rents collected from the land and a duty to use reasonable efforts to preserve and maintain the land so as to avoid injury or diminution of its
value. Id. § 4.28, at 232; id. § 4.29, at 234.
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is appropriate. For example, some court decisions have concluded that a
mortgagee cannot obtain the appointment of a receiver if the mortgagee's
security is adequate (i.e., if the value of the mortgaged land exceeds the debt)
and/or the land is not subject to existing or threatened waste.1 73 Other court
decisions go even further and require a showing that the mortgagor is insolvent.1 74 The experience of practicing commercial real estate attorneys reported to the UARA's drafting committee also reflects this variation. Attorneys in some states reported that they routinely obtain the appointment of a
receiver after the mortgagor's default, without demonstrating more than the
existence of a default and the presence of a clause in the mortgage by which
the mortgagor consented to the appointment of a receiver following default.
By contrast, attorneys in other states reported that courts would not appoint a
receiver without substantial documentary evidence of waste by the mortgagor
(i.e., physical destruction or deterioration of the mortgaged premises).
Even in states that have adopted some statutory guidelines, there remains significant state-to-state variation. Some statutes require a showing that
the land is threatened with waste or comparable injury 175 and/or that the
land's value does not provide sufficient security for the debt.1 76 Other stat173. See, e.g., Dart v. W. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 438 P.2d 407 (Ariz. 1968); Atco
Constr. & Dev. Corp. v. Beneficial Say. Bank, F.S.B., 523 So. 2d 747 (Fla. Div. Ct.
App. 1988); Societe Generale v. Charles & Co. Acquisition, Inc. 597 N.Y.S.2d 1004
(N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
174. See, e.g., Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Frantz Klodt & Son, Inc., 237 N.W.2d
350 (Minn. 1975) (per curiam). But see Travelers Ins. Co. v. Tritsch, 438 N.W.2d 863
(Iowa Ct. App. 1989) (insolvency not required if mortgage specifically assigned rents
as security).
175. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-8-3 (1994) ("manifest danger of loss, destruction, or
material injury" regarding assets charged with payment of debt); IOWA CODE § 680.1
(1998) (loss or material injury to property or its rents and profits); KAN. STAT. ANN. §

60-1304 (1994) (immediate and irreparable injury likely to result absent appointment); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 381.420 (West 2002) (waste or threat of waste), id. §
425.600 (West 1992) (loss or material injury to property); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
600.2927 (2002) (receiver may be appointed to correct/prevent waste in form of nonpayment of taxes/insurance); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-65-10 (2005) (loss or material
injury to property or its rents and profits); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 813.16(1) (West 1994)

(loss or material injury to property or its rents and profits)
176. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-117-208 (1999) (threat of material injury to land or
mortgage default plus probable inadequacy of security); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §

564(b)(2) (West 1979, amended 1991) (threat of material injury to land or mortgage
default plus probable inadequacy of security); COLO. REV. STAT. § 38-38-601 (2000)
(inadequate security or threat of injury that could render security inadequate); IDAHO
CODE ANN. §§ 8-601(2), 8-601(A)(2) (2004) (inadequate security or threat of injury/loss to property or its income); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-20-102(2) (2005) (threat
of material injury to land or mortgage default plus probable inadequacy of security);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1081 (1995) (threat of material injury or probable inadequacy
of security); NEV. REV. STAT. § 32.010(2) (2003) (threat of material injury to land or
mortgage default plus probable inadequacy of security); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-10-
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to the
utes, however, authorize the appointment of a receiver without regard
77
adequacy of the mortgagee's security or the mortgagor's solvency. 1
Moreover, there is significant state-to-state variation regarding whether
the parties may circumvent any equitable or statutory limitations upon the
appointment of a receiver by contractual stipulation. Assignments of rents
commonly contain a clause whereby the mortgagor/assignor consents in advance to the appointment of a receiver (often on an ex parte basis) following
default. In some states, statutes and/or court decisions have validated receivership clauses as a matter of law.' 78 Courts in other states give receivership
clauses evidentiary weight but do not make them determinative. 179 In other
states, however,
courts have refused to enforce such clauses as contrary to
80
public policy.'
The UARA attempts to address some of these inconsistencies, and codifies and/or clarifies the law regarding rent receiverships as follows:

* The UARA establishes clearjurisdictionalpredicatesfor receivership motions. Traditionally, receivership is an ancillary remedy
that requires the moving party to have filed some other pending ju01(2) (1996) (threat of material injury to land or mortgage default plus probable inadequacy of security); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2735.01(B) (LexisNexis 2000) (threat
of material injury to land or mortgage default plus probable inadequacy of security);
TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 64.001 (Vernon 1997) (threat of material injury
to land or mortgage default plus probable inadequacy of security); UT. R. Civ. P.
66(a)(1) (threat of material injury to land or mortgage default plus probable inadequacy of security); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-33-101(a)(iv) (2005) (threat of material
injury to land or mortgage default plus probable inadequacy of security).
177. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 33-702(B)(1) (2000) (court may appoint
without regard to adequacy of security); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.60.025(1)(b)(ii)
(1992 & Supp. 2004) (perfected assignment of rents sufficient to justify appointment);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 559.17(2) (2000) (court may appoint without regard to adequacy
of security where agreement so provides).
178. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/15-1702(b) (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. §
32-30-5-1(4)(C) (West 2002); MINN STAT. ANN. § 559.17(2) (West 2000) (mortgages
of $100,000 or more); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 254(10) (McKinney 1989); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1551(2)(c) (West 1991); Fed. Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v.
Nazar, 100 B.R. 555, 559 (D. Kan. 1989); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n v.
Denver Hotel Ass'n Ltd. P'ship, 830 P.2d 1138, 1139-40 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Fleet
Bank of Maine v. Zimelman, 575 A.2d 731, 733-34 (Me. 1990); Metro. Life Ins. Co.
v. Liberty Ctr. Venture, 650 A.2d 887, 891 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994).
179. See, e.g., Wellman Sav. Bank v. Roth, 432 N.W.2d 697, 698-99 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1988); Riverside Props. v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am., 590 S.W.2d
736, 738 (Tex. App. 1979); Barclays Bank of Cal. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. Rptr.
743, 748 (App. 1977).
180. See, e.g., Dart v. W. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 438 P.2d 407 (Ariz. 1968); Chromy
v. Midwest Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Minneapolis, 546 So. 2d 1172, 1173 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Barclays Bank, P.L.C. v. Davidson Ave. Assocs., Ltd., 644
A.2d 685, 686-87 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994).
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dicial action (i.e., an action to which the receivership would be ancillary). In states that recognize only judicial foreclosure, the existence of a judicial foreclosure proceeding provides the action to
which a receivership may be ancillary. In states that authorize
power of sale foreclosure, however, a mortgagee may foreclose
privately without any judicial proceeding.' 8' In these states, the
lack of any pending action raises a concern about whether the
mortgagee can obtain the "ancillary" remedy of a receivership. The
UARA addresses this concern by making clear that the assignee
can file an action for specific performance of the assignment of
rents - which would provide a sufficient jurisdictional predicate for
even if the assignee chose to forethe appointment of a receiver
82
close by power of sale.'
* The UARA establishes coherent uniform standardsfor the appointment of a receiver. The UARA provides that an assignee is

entitled to the appointment of a receiver if the assignor of rents is
in default and either (1) the assignor has agreed to the appointment
of a receiver after default, (2) the value of the mortgaged premises
appears insufficient to satisfy the mortgage debt, (3) the UARA obligates the assignor to turn over to the assignee rents collected by
the assignor, but the assignor has failed to do so, or (4) a subordinate assignee of rents obtains the appointment of a receiver.' 8 3 A
uniform standard should provide for more consistent treatment of
similarly situated mortgagees.
* The UARA confirms existing law regarding priority between
conflicting receivers. Where more than one rents assignee seeks
the appointmerit of a receiver, the UARA provides a priority rule
modeled upon Section 4.5 of the Restatement of Mortgages. The
UARA's general priority rules for conflicting assignments of rents
are based upon time of recording.' 84 Thus, if a senior assignee of
rents is entitled to the appointment of a receiver, the court's appointment of that receiver will take priority over and displace a
prior receivership obtained by a subordinate assignee.1 5 Any proceeds previously collected by the receiver for the subordinate asNELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 7.19, at 665.
182. UARA § 7(b)(2) & cmt. 1.
183. Id. § 7(a)(1). While nearly all situations justifying receivership will fall under
one or more of these categories, UARA also preserves the traditional equitable discretion of judges to identify other circumstances justifying the appointment of a receiver.
Id. § 7(a)(2) (court may appoint receiver if "other circumstances exist that would
justify the appointment of a receiver under law of this state other than [UARA]").
184. Id. § 5(b), (c).
185. Id. § 7(0(1).

181.
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signee, however, need not be turned over to the receiver for the
senior assignee, but would instead be applied by the8 junior
receiver
6
in the manner specified in its order of appointment.'
The UARA does not address every conceivable issue involving rent receivers. For example, the UARA does not address whether an assignee of
rents is entitled to the appointment of a receiver on an ex parte basis. Many
commercial mortgage documents purport to authorize such ex parte appointments, and some courts have routinely granted receiverships without prior
notice to the assignor. 8 7 The drafting committee chose to leave to judicial
resolution or other legislation the question of whether (and in what circumstances) prior notice to the assignor is excused.188 Likewise, the UARA does
not specifically address the extent to which a receiver can terminate or disaffirm existing leases. In many states, statutory or case law regarding receiverships has generally established (or limited) the receiver's power to terminate
leases in default or to disaffirm leases not in default.'8 9 Likewise, the court
order appointing a receiver will often specify the extent to which a receiver
can terminate or disaffirm existing leases with or without the approval of the
court and/or the assignee. Accordingly, the drafting committee resolved to
leave this issue 90to the terms of the court order appointing the receiver and
other state law. 1
B. Enforcement by Notification to the Assignor and the Assignor's Liabilityfor Failureto Comply with a Turnover Notification
Defaulting mortgagors sometimes engage in "milking" of rents - i.e.,
collecting rents and using the proceeds for purposes unrelated to repayment
of the mortgage or preservation of the mortgaged premises. Milking of rents
that have been assigned as security poses a significant concern, particularly to
an undersecured mortgagee that cannot expect full recovery of the mortgage
debt via foreclosure. This concern is even more severe if the undersecured
mortgage debt is nonrecourse, because the mortgagor will have no personal
liability for a deficiency judgment. Such a threat often causes the mortgagee
to take prompt action following default to enforce its interest in rents.
Between the time that the mortgagor defaults and the time the mortgagee effectively enforces its security interest in rents, the mortgagor has
often collected rents and subsequently disposed of them. In this situation, the
assignee may seek to recover the damages that it suffered because the mort186. Id. § 7(0(2).
187. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 4.36, at 265.
188. UARA § 7 cmt. 7.
189. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.4 (1997) (Reporter's
Note) (collecting cases).
190. UARA § 7 cmt. 8.
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gagor milked rents that might otherwise have reduced the mortgage debt. The
common law treated such a mortgagor's conduct as a species of legal waste consistent with its treatment of "rents" as an incorporeal hereditament in the
nature of real property. 19 1 However, many courts held that the mortgagor's
expenditure of collected rents could only constitute waste if the mortgagee/assignee had taken sufficient steps to enforce its security interest in
rents by divesting the mortgagor of control over those rents.' 92 Thus, as explained in Part II, most courts required the assignee of rents to become a
mortgagee in possession, obtain the appointment of a receiver, obtain a judicial order requiring the sequestration of rents, or (in some cases) notify tenants to pay rentals directly to the assignee. 193 Under this view, it did not
clearly suffice for the assignee merely to make a demand upon the assignor to
turn over rents as the assignor collected them from tenants.
To a significant extent, this traditional reticence may have reflected a
practical concern over the ostensible ownership problem that would exist
while the mortgagor remained in possession of collected rents. Certainly,
third party claimants - e.g., trade creditors to whom the mortgagor might
transfer cash proceeds of collected rents in ordinary course transactions could be easily misled by the mortgagor's control over that cash. However,
existing doctrines (such as the negotiability of money) already provide sufficient protection for bona fide third parties that receive payments comprised of
proceeds of rents.' 94 The ostensible ownership problem alone should not negate the ability of the assignee to make an effective demand for the payment
of rents collected by the assignor. Furthermore, a turnover demand could
establish a clear and objective predicate for the assignor's liability for failure
to comply with such a demand - even if other priority doctrines prevented the
assignee from tracing its security interest into the hands of good faith transferees (such as employees or trade creditors of the assignor).

191. The common law generally imposed liability for waste upon a mortgagor for
any affirmative action that damaged or destroyed the mortgaged real property, thereby
reducing its value. In title theory jurisdictions, this liability extended to the full reduction in the collateral's value; under the lien theory, this liability existed only to the
extent that the waste actually impaired the mortgagee's security. NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 4.4, at 163-64.
192. See, e.g., Taylor v. Brennan, 621 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. 1981) (mortgagor's collection and disposition of rents following mortgagee's enforcement of security interest in rents would constitute waste, but no waste occurred where mortgagee had not
taken sufficient steps to enforce its security interest in rents).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 105-12 1.
194. Cf U.C.C. § 9-332(a) (2001) ("A transferee of money takes the money free
of a security interest unless the transferee acts in collusion with the debtor in violating
the rights of the secured party."); id. § 9-332(b) ("A transferee of funds from a deposit
account takes the funds free of a security interest in the deposit account unless the
transferee acts in collusion with the debtor in violating the rights of the secured
party.").
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The Restatement of Mortgages first sought to address this problem by
making clear an assignee can enforce its interest in rents by an effective turnover demand upon the assignor, 195 thereby providing an objective predicate
for the assignor's liability for failure to comply with the demand., 96 California's comprehensive assignment of rents statute provides a comparable result. 19 7 Consistent with these earlier reforms, the UARA provides that upon
the assignor's default or as otherwise agreed by the assignor, "the assignee
may give the assignor a notification demanding that the assignor pay over the
proceeds of any rents that the assignee is entitled to collect."' If the assignor
receives this notification and thereafter collects rents but fails to turn them
over to the assignee, the
assignor is liable to the assignee in the amount of the
199
rents not turned over.
The assignor's liability under the UARA for failure to turn over rents is
based upon harm to the assignee's security and is thus in the nature of liabil195. Section 4.2(c) of the Restatement provides:
The mortgage may provide that the mortgagee may commence collection
of the rents at any time or, in any event, upon mortgagor default. The
mortgagee's right to actual possession of the rents arises upon:
(1)satisfaction of any conditions in the mortgage; and
(2) delivery of a demand for the rents to the mortgagor, the holder of the
equity of redemption, and each person who holds a mortgage on the real
property or on its rents of which the mortgagee has notice.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.2(c) (1997).
196. Id. § 4.6(a)(5) ("Waste occurs when, without the mortgagee's consent, the
mortgagor ...

retains possession of rents to which the mortgagee has the right of

possession ...").
197. CAL. CiV. CODE § 2938(c)(4) (West 1993 & Supp. 2005) (amended 1996)
("The assignment shall be enforced by one or more of the following: ...(4) Delivery
to the assignor of a written demand for the rents, issues, or profits, a copy of which
shall be mailed to all other assignees of record of the leases, rents, issues, and profits
of the real property at the address for notices provided in the assignment or, if none,
to the address to which the recorded assignment was to be mailed after recording.").
198. UARA § 8(a). The assignee must also give a copy of the notification to any
other person that held a recorded assignment of rents on the land as of a date ten days
prior to the notification date. Id.
199. Id. § 14(d). It is worth noting that UARA's measure of liability does not
precisely duplicate the Restatement approach. In lien theory states, courts traditionally
held that the mortgagor was liable for waste only to the extent that its conduct impaired the mortgagee's security. Rather than focusing upon impairment of security which would require proof of the value of the mortgaged real property - UARA simply provides that the assignor is liable to the full extent of the rents that it was obligated but failed to turn over to the assignee. Id. § 14(d). UARA requires the assignee
to apply any such recovery to reduction of the secured obligation, id. § 12, and thus
the assignee's total recovery could not exceed the loss that the assignee actually suffered. Id. § 12(3). In the unlikely event that there remained a surplus after the assignee's full satisfaction, the assignee would be obligated to pay the surplus to the
assignor or to subordinate lienholders in accordance with UARA § 12. Id. § 12(4)-(5).
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ity for conversion; it is not liability on the debt itself in the nature of a deficiency judgment. Thus, a mortgagor that engaged in milking of rents could
not avoid liability under the UARA simply because the underlying mortgage
debt was nonrecourse, or because other state law limits the mortgagor's personal liability for repayment of the mortgage debt. 2° ° The UARA does not
specifically address whether an assignee of rents can contractually waive the
assignor's liability for failure to turn over rents, but there appears to be no
sound policy reason why sophisticated commercial parties could not knowingly contract for such a result.

C. Enforcement by Notification to Tenants
UCC Article 9 provides a firm statutory foundation for notificationbased financing of accounts, chattel paper and payment intangibles. After
default or as otherwise agreed by the debtor, an assignee of an account, chattel paper, or payment intangible can notify the account debtor to make payment or otherwise render performance directly to the secured party. 20 1 Upon
receipt of such a notification, the account debtor must pay the secured party
and cannot
thereafter discharge its obligation through payment to the
20 2
debtor.

Because real property rents are essentially identical to accounts receivable,2 °3 a comparable notification scheme is appropriate for an assignee seeking to enforce its security interest in real property rents. The common law of
contracts, as reflected in Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 338,2o
provides the general framework for enforcement by notification to tenants.
200. This is consistent with the weight of case authority. See, e.g., Hoelting Enters. v. Nelson, 929 P.2d 183, 187 (Kan. Ct. App. 1996); Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp. v.
Axinn, 676 A.2d 552 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (per curiam). See also Evergreen Ventures v. McDonald (In re Evergreen Ventures), 147 B.R. 751, 755 (Bankr.
D. Ariz. 1992) (distinguishing deficiency action and waste action).
201. U.C.C. § 9-607(a)(1) (2001).
202. Id. § 9-404(a).
203. In fact, rents from real property are "accounts" under revised Article 9. "Account" includes any "right to payment of a monetary obligation.., for property that
has been or is to be sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed of .... Id.
§ 9-I02(a)(2)(i). Here, the term "property" is not limited solely to personal property,
and the revisers made clear that the vendor's rights to installment payments under a
contract for deed constitute an account within the meaning of Article 9. "Rents"
would likewise fit this definition; however, Article 9's general exclusion of any security interest in land or rents from land makes it irrelevant that real property rents in
fact fit within the definition of accounts.
204. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 338(1) (1981)
("[N]otwithstanding an assignment, the assignor retains his power to discharge or
modify the duty of the obligor to the extent that the obligor performs or otherwise
gives value until but not after the obligor receives notification that the right has been
assigned and that performance is to be rendered to the assignee.").
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The new Restatement of Mortgages implicitly recognized the mortgagee's
capacity to enforce its interest in rents via direct notification to tenants, but
did not elaborate on the third party implications of this remedy, choosing
instead to incorporate by reference background contract law principles. 20 5 By
contrast, California's comprehensive assignment of rents statute provided
more detailed provisions regarding the rights and obligations of tenants receiving such notifications - in part, based upon concern that such tenants may
often lack the sophistication needed to understand the legal ramifications of
notification.
The UARA recognizes the assignee's capacity to collect rents via direct
notification to a tenant, and (similar to the California statute) provides moderately detailed provisions addressing the content and effect of such a notification. In particular:
* The UARA provides minimum content for the notification. The

notification to a tenant must be signed by the assignee and: (1)
identify the tenant, the assignor, the assignee, the premises, and the
assignment of rents being enforced; (2) provide the recording data
for the document creating the assignment of rents or other reasonable proof of the assignment; (3) state the assignee's right to collect the rents; (4) direct the tenant to pay the assignee all unpaid
accrued rents and all unaccrued rents as they come due; (5) provide
the name and telephone number of a contact person and an address
to which the tenant can direct payment and any inquiry tor additional information about the assignment or the assignee's right to
enforce it; (6) describe the manner in which the UARA's provisions affect the tenant's payment obligations; and (7) state that the
tenant may consult a 2lawyer
if the tenant has questions about its
06
rights and obligations.
205. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.2 cmt. d (1997) ("This
section does not delineate the rights and obligations of the lessee or other obligor after
the mortgagee triggers the right to collect rents. A lessee may, for example, be concerned with the potential for double liability if it erroneously pays the mortgagee
rather than [the] mortgagor. Such questions are to be resolved in accordance with
Restatement, Second, Contracts § 338 .... ").
206. UARA § 9(a)(1)-(7). UARA adopts a media-neutral definition of "sign" that
permits authenticated notification by electronic means in appropriate cases. Id. §§
2(16), 3(a)(2). UARA also provides a "safe harbor" form notification. Id. § 10.
In addition to the tenant, the assignee must give a copy of the notification to
the assignor and to "any other person that, 10 days before the notification date, held a
recorded assignment of rents arising from the real property." Id. § 9(a). This would
obligate an assignee enforcing its assignment of rents to conduct a record search and
notify any senior or junior rents assignee. If the enforcing assignee failed to give
notification to another recorded rents assignee, this failure would not defeat the effectiveness of the notification vis-a-vis the assignor and the tenants. Id. § 9(f).
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e The UARA provides tenants with a reasonableperiod in which
to obtain legal advice regarding the effect of notification. An assignee of rents may make a demand upon tenants just before the
next month's rent falls due. A tenant receiving such a notification
might understandably wish to seek legal advice regarding the effect
of the notification, but might also reasonably fear that any delay in
payment of rent could result in an argument that the tenant has
breached its lease. To address this situation, the UARA provides
that a tenant that receives a notification to pay rents to the assignee
is not in default for nonpayment of rents accruing after the date the
notification is received before the earlier of 10 days after the date
the next regularly scheduled rent payment would be due or 30 days
after the date the tenant receives the notification. In this way, the
UARA provides a tenant with a reasonable period in which to delay payment while seeking legal advice, without
the risk that such
20 7
lease.
the
of
termination
in
result
could
a delay
* The UARA codifies existing law regardingthe tenant'spotential
risk of "double payment," but with specialprotectionfor residential tenants. The UARA provides that upon receipt of a sufficient
notification from the assignee, the tenant must pay the assignee in
order to discharge its rental obligation, and also provides that the
tenant's payment to the assignee satisfies the tenant's obligation
under its lease to the extent of the payment. 20 8 The tenant must
continue to direct payment to the assignee until the assignee cancels its notification or the tenant receives a court order directing
payment in a different manner. 20 9 If the tenant occupies the premises as its primary residence, however, the tenant can discharge his
or her rental obligation by paying either the assignor or the assignee.210 In this respect, the UARA accords the residential tenant
with more favorable treatment than Article 9 generally affords to
consumer account debtors. 2 11 The drafting committee concluded
that such treatment was justified because residential tenants, especially unsophisticated ones, might be particularly likely to pay the
assignor in good faith - either out of ignorance or, more likely, iii

207. Id. § 9(d). This "grace period," so to speak, would not provide the tenant
with any additional time in which to pay rents that had already accrued prior to the
tenant's receipt of the notification.
208. Id. § 9(c)(1)-(3).
209. Id. § 9(c)(4).
210. Id. § 9(cX2).
211. In terms of an account debtor's nondischarge for improperly directing payment to the assignor, U.C.C. § 9-404(a) makes no distinction between consumer and
nonconsumer account debtors.
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response to improper eviction threats from the assignor - and that
12
such tenants ought not be at risk of eviction from their homes. 2
D. Collection of Rent and Payment of OperatingExpenses
A commercial lease typically obligates the tenant to pay periodic sums
to the landlord on account of property-related expenses such as real property
taxes, insurance, and property maintenance - either the tenant's pro rata share
of entire cost of taxes, insurance, and maintenance expenses, or the tenant's
pro rata share of the increase in such costs or expenses beyond an established
baseline amount. Leases customarily characterize the tenant's obligation to
pay these sums as "rent" or "additional rent," and most assignment of rents
documents include these sums as part of the "rents" assigned a security for
the mortgage debt. Based upon these customary practices, the UARA defines
the term "rents" to213include amounts payable on account of these carrying
costs of ownership.
Commercial mortgagees and tenants have substantial economic incentives to make sure that the mortgagor properly accounts for these carrying
costs. A taxing authority's lien for unpaid real estate taxes typically primes
both the mortgagee's lien and the tenant's leasehold interest. 2 14 Thus, foreclosure of a real estate tax lien directly threatens the security of each party's
respective investment in the mortgaged premises. Likewise, if insurance premiums are unpaid, an uninsured casualty could destroy the mortgaged premises - and each party's respective investment in the premises. Finally, adequate property maintenance helps to maximize the likelihood that the property remains fully leased and thereby preserves the value of the property over
time - again protecting the respective investments of the mortgagee and the
tenants. The mortgagee thus has a substantial interest in making sure that
taxes and insurance premiums are paid in a timely manner, and that appropriate property maintenance occurs (and is paid for) on a regular basis. For this
reason, the mortgage document typically includes detailed covenants
to en2 15
sure the mortgagor's timely performance of these responsibilities.
212. The UARA drafting committee recognized that this protection for residential
tenants made it more problematic for an assignee to enforce its assignment of rents by
notification to tenants in cases where the mortgaged premises is an apartment complex.
Nevertheless, the committee concluded that the protection was justified because an
assignee that wanted to preserve the potential liability of tenants could instead enforce
its assignment of rents by obtaining the appointment of a receiver. UARA § 9 cmt. 2.
213. Id. § 2(12)(E) (rents includes "sums payable to an assignor for payment or
reimbursement of expenses incurred in owning, operating and maintaining, or constructing or installing improvements on, real property").
214. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 4.45, at 293.
215. See, e.g., R. WILSON FREYERMUTH, JOHN P. MCNEARNEY, DEBRA POGRUND
STARK & DALE A. WHITMAN, ANATOMY OF A MORTGAGE: UNDERSTANDING AND
NEGOTIATING COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE LOANS 81-84, 107-10 (ABA 2001) (dis-
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What happens, however, if the mortgagor defaults and the mortgagee
begins collecting rents and "additional rents" directly from tenants? As noted
above, the mortgagee has a substantial economic incentive to make sure that
taxes and insurance are paid, and that adequate property maintenance continues. But is the mortgagee legally obligated to pay these expenses, or to apply
"additional rents" paid by tenants to the payment of these expenses? Or may
the mortgagee instead choose to apply those sums to the mortgage debt?
California's comprehensive assignment of rents statute does impose an
affirmative duty on the assignee to use any rents that it collects to pay the
reasonable expenses of operating and maintaining the real property."' For a
variety of reasons, this is arguably a sensible duty to impose upon the mortgagee. First, because mortgagees typically do use collected rents to pay these
expenses, such a rule arguably tracks standard commercial practice. Second,
if the mortgagee uses a receiver to collect rents, the receivership order typically requires the receiver to apply collected rents to the costs of operating
and preserving the real property anyway. Finally, tenants certainly have a
substantial practical expectation that additional rents will be applied to the
payment of taxes, insurance, and maintenance in a fashion that preserves the
tenant's expected bargain regarding the property.
Nevertheless, the traditional rule prevailing in all other states is to the
contrary. The landlord's obligation to pay taxes, insurance, and maintenance
expenses - even if that obligation is expressed or implied into its tenant leases
- does not bind the mortgagee as a successor until the mortgagee acquires
possession or ownership of the real property (by becoming a mortgagee in
possession or purchasing the premises at foreclosure). If a mortgagee purchases the real property at foreclosure, the mortgagee then becomes obligated
to fulfill the assignor's responsibilities under the tenant leases that survive the
foreclosure,217 as the landlord's covenants in those leases run with the real
property to bind the mortgagee as successor landlord. Likewise, if the mortgagee becomes a "mortgagee-in-possession" prior to foreclosure, the common law imposes a duty upon the mortgagee to apply collected rents to the

cussing paragraphs 15 and 19 of the Fannie Mae uniform deed of trust form for multifamily housing).
216. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2938(g)(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 2005) (amended 1996).
217. Because the foreclosure sale transfers title to the sale purchaser of the same
quality as existed on the date that the mortgage was granted, see NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 7.17, at 663, a foreclosure sale would generally extinguish
leases that were entered into after the mortgage was granted but would not affect
leases that were entered into prior to the date the mortgage was granted. Frequently,
however, subordinate leases remain unaffected by a foreclosure sale either as a function of express or implied nondisturbance and attornment agreements between the
mortgagee and the tenants. For further discussion, see GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A.
WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER,
MATERIALS 352-56 (6th ed. 2003).
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preservation of the mortgaged premises.218 But if the mortgagee merely collects rents that accrue prior to foreclosure - without taking either actual or
constructive possession of the real property - prevailing law permits the
mortgagee to apply those rents to the mortgage debt without legal obligation
to pay taxes, insurance, or maintenance expenses. Prior to foreclosure, the
mortgagee is not a successor that is bound to perform the landlord's covenants under tenant leases. Furthermore, courts have consistently refused to
treat additional rent payments, escrow payments and the like as being impressed with a "trust" that creates any affirmative219obligation on the mortgagee with respect to the application of such funds.
The initial draft of the UARA - which was based in significant part
upon the template established by California's assignment of rents statute would have obligated the mortgagee to apply collected rents to the reasonable
expenses of maintaining the property. 220 Over the course of several meetings,
however, the drafting committee eventually concluded that the UARA should
codify the prevailing rule that the mortgagee's collection of rents does not by
itself affirmatively obligate the mortgagee to apply those rents to property
218. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 4.27, at 230-31.
219. Id. § 4.18, at 204-07 (discussing prevailing judicial treatment of mortgage
escrow accounts). In fact, courts traditionally have held that a landlord does not even
hold a tenant's security deposit subject to any implied trust, but that the deposit creates only a simple debt owing from the landlord to the tenant. See generally R. Wilson
Freyermuth, Are Security Deposits "Security Interests "? The ProperScope of Article
9 and Statutory Interpretationin Consumer Class Actions, 68 Mo. L. REv. 71, 81-84
(2003). Statutory reform in some states now imposes a trust or trust-like responsibility
upon the landlord for handling of tenant security deposits, and this responsibility
would extend to an assignee that took control over security deposits. Outside of California, however, mortgagees have no similar statutory trust or trust-like responsibility
for handling additional rents paid by tenants.
220. Section 12 of the December 2003 meeting draft provided as follows:
(a) If the assignee collects any rents following enforcement of an assignment of rents.. ., the assignor or any other person holding a recorded assignment of rents on the real property may deliver to the assignee a notification demanding that the assignee pay the reasonable costs of protecting
and preserving the real property, including payment of taxes and insurance.
(b) Following receipt of a notification under subsection (a), the assignee
shall pay for the reasonable costs of protecting and preserving the real
property to the extent of any rents actually received by the assignee. This
obligation shall continue until the date on which the assignee obtains the
appointment of a receiver ...or the date on which the assignee ceases to
enforce the assignment, whichever occurs first.
(c) Nothing in this Section shall require the assignee to operate or manage
the real property, which obligation shall remain that of the assignor.
Uniform Mortgagee Access to Rents Act § 12 (Discussion Draft 2003), availableat
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/maripp/dec2003mtgdraft.htm (last visited Feb. 9,
2006).
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operating expenses. 221 The committee was motivated in part by prudential
concerns - i.e., the desire to avoid a potential objection to enactment from the
mortgage lending industry. However, one might also justify the committee's
decision by simply recognizing that in this situation, practicality may dominate the lack of obligation. In the typical case, a mortgagee that does collect
additional rents directly from tenants will apply those sums (if necessary) to
the payment of taxes, insurance, and maintenance expenses to protect its own
economic interest, despite having no affirmative legal obligation to do so.
Another reason why a prudent mortgagee will apply collected rents to
the payment of property-related expenses is to avoid any possible claim or
defense that a tenant might have to payment of rent based upon the landlord's
nonperformance of the lease agreement. In some cases, the landlord's failure
to maintain the property as specified in the lease will breach the lease. In
some cases, this breach may give the tenant a defense to payment of rents
(e.g., if the lease gives the tenant a right to terminate the lease following uncured landlord defaults); in other cases, the breach may give the tenant an
affirmative claim for damages that the tenant might use as a basis for claiming an offset against accrued rents. The UARA makes clear that while a mortgagee has no affirmative duty to apply collected rents to the payment of property-related expenses, the mortgagee's right to collect rents from tenants is
"subject to the terms of the agreement between the assignor and tenant and
any claim or defense arising from the assignor's nonperformance of that
agreement," unless the tenant has made an enforceable agreement not to assert claims or defenses against the mortgagee. 222 The UARA adopts this position so as to be least disruptive of the contractual expectations of mortgagees
and tenants. If the lease provides the tenant with the basis for a claim or defense regarding rent payments and the tenant has not agreed to waive such
claims and defenses, the UARA preserves the tenant's ability to raise such
claims or defenses if the mortgagee attempts to collect rents directly from the
tenant. However, if the tenant has agreed to waive such claims or defenses as mortgage lenders commonly require many tenants to do by executing sub-

221. UARA § 13(a) ("Unless otherwise agreed by the assignee . . ., an assignee
that collects rents following enforcement..." by notification may apply the proceeds
in accordance with UARA's distribution scheme and "need not apply them to the
payment of expenses of protecting or maintaining the real property subject to the
assignment.").
222. Id. § 13(b). This provision is substantially comparable to the analogous Article 9 provision regarding a secured party's rights against an account debtor. See
U.C.C. § 9-404(a) ("Unless an account debtor has made an enforceable agreement not
to assert defenses or claims, ... the rights of an assignee are subject to... all terms of
the agreement between the account debtor and assignor and any defense or claim in
recoupment arising from the transaction that gave rise to the contract ... ").

HeinOnline -- 71 Mo. L. Rev. 56 2006

2006]

UNIFORMASSIGNMENT OF RENTS

ordination, nondisturbance and223attomment agreements (SNDAs) - the mortgagee can enforce that waiver.
E. PriorityAmong Competing Rent Assignments
The owner of a commercial real estate development may obtain two or
more mortgage loans, each also secured by assignments of rents. In the event
of a default, each such mortgagee/assignee may independently act to enforce
its respective security interest in rents. In this situation, state law must provide a priority rule to resolve the conflicting claims of each mortgagee/assignee. Generally speaking, each state's recording statute provides
the default priority rule for conflicting claims to real estate. As a result, an
earlier assignment of leases and rents will (if properly recorded) have priority
over a subsequent assignment with respect to224both unaccrued and accrued but
unpaid rents. The UARA codifies this result.
It is possible, of course, that a junior assignee may take action to collect
rents (either directly or through the appointment of a receiver) before a senior
assignee has taken steps to enforce its interest in rents. In these situations, a
junior assignee may collect rents from tenants for one or more periods before
it receives notification that the senior assignee is enforcing its rights. When
the junior assignee learns of the senior's enforcement, must the junior assignee turn over any rents that it collected before it received notification of
the senior's enforcement efforts?
The Restatement (Third) of Property - Mortgages addressed this priority
question in the context of priorities between competing receivers. Section
4.5(b) provides that a receiver appointed under a junior mortgage has the
right to collect rents until a receiver is appointed by the senior mortgagee and
to apply those rents to the balance of the junior mortgage obligation (rather
than the senior mortgage debt). 225 The Restatement authors took the view that
223. UARA also recognizes that a tenant may have standing to seek the appointment of a receiver for the real property or other relief if the mortgagee's nonpayment
of property-related expenses has caused or threatened harm to the tenant's leasehold
interest. UARA § 13(c). The Act does not establish that such a tenant has a legal right
to such relief, but leaves this issue to other law of the state and to judicial resolution
on a case-by-case basis. Id. § 13 cmt. 3.
224. Id. § 5(c) ("[A] perfected security interest in rents takes priority over the
rights of a person that, after the security interest is perfected ...purchases an interest
in the rents or the real property from which [they] arise."). UARA defines "purchase"
to include taking an interest in a voluntary transaction, id. § 2(11), and thus a subsequent rents assignee would be a purchaser within the meaning of section 5(c).

225.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES

§ 4.5(b) (1997) ("When a

junior mortgagee obtains the appointment of a receiver, that receiver has the right,
until a receiver is appointed under a senior mortgage, to collect rents from the mortgaged real estate and, after first using them to pay real estate taxes and other reasonable expenses associated with the maintenance and repair of the real estate, to apply
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this result "rewards the diligent junior mortgagee" and did not harm the sen226
ior mortgagee that had as yet not taken steps to enforce its interest in rents.
California's comprehensive assignment of rents statute provides a similar
result, even in cases where the junior mortgagee has enforced its interest in
rents by direct collection rather than through a receivership. 227 Although there
is some contrary authority requiring the junior mortgagee to turn over net
rents collected upon a demand by the senior mortgagee, the weight of the
moderate case authority allows the junior mortgagee to retain rents collected
in good faith prior to receiving notification from the senior assignee. 229 The
UARA codifies this position, 230 which is also consistent with Article 9's
23 1
treatment of conflicting security interests in cash proceeds of receivables.

the balance to the junior mortgage obligation."). Section 4.5(b), however, does not
address the situation where a senior mortgagee/assignee seeks to enforce its assignment by means other than the appointment of a receiver.
226. Id. § 4.5 comment b ("This preference for the junior mortgagee.., rewards
the diligent junior mortgagee. Had the latter not sought the appointment of a receiver,
the rents that accrued prior to the appointment of the senior mortgage receiver would
have gone to the mortgagor and not to the senior lienholder. Thus, allowing the junior
mortgagee to reap the benefit of those rents places the senior mortgagee in no worse a
position than would have been the case had the junior mortgagee failed to act.").
227. California's statute provides, in pertinent part:
[I]f an assignee who has recorded its interest in leases, rents, issues, and
profits prior to the recordation of such interest by a subsequent assignee
seeks to enforce its interest in those rents, issues, or profits in accordance
with this section after any enforcement action has been taken by a subsequent assignee, the prior assignee shall be entitled only to the rents, issues,
and profits that are accrued and unpaid as of the date of its enforcement
action and unpaid rents, issues, and profits accruing thereafter. The prior
assignee shall have no right to rents, issues, or profits paid prior to the
date of the enforcement action, whether in the hands of the assignor or any
subsequent assignee.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2938(h) (West 1993 & Supp. 2005) (amended 1996).
228. See, e.g., Bergin v. Robbins, 146 A. 724 (Conn. 1929); N.J. Title & Guarantee Co. v. Cone & Co., 53 A. 97 (N.J. 1902).
229. See, e.g., Stevens v. Blue, 57 N.E.2d 451 (Ill. 1944); Detroit Props. Corp. v.
Detroit Hotel Co., 242 N.W. 213 (Mich. 1932); Goddard v. Clarke, 116 N.W. 41
(Neb. 1908); Vecchiarelli v. Garsal Realty, Inc., 443 N.Y.S.2d 622 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1980).
230. UARA § 14(0.
231. As long as a party with a junior security interest in receivables acts in good
faith and does not collude with the debtor to violate the rights of the senior, the junior
can collect and the cash proceeds of those receivables and apply them to the debt free
of the conflicting claim of a senior secured party. See U.C.C. § 9-331 cmt. 5 (2001).
Thus, a junior secured party could obtain priority in receivables collections if it acted
in good faith (which includes both "honesty in fact" and "observance of reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing," id. § 1-201(b)(20)), which it could do if it did
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The UARA also makes clear that competing rents assignees are free to make
modifying their respective priorities as to rents or
intercreditor agreements
232
proceeds of rents.
F. PriorityBetween Rents Assignees and Article 9 Secured Parties
The common law traditionally treated "rent" as an incorporeal hereditament in the nature of real property.2 33 As a result, the law has required that a
security interest in "rents" must be created by a document that satisfies real
estate law's conveyancing formalities, and that this document must be recorded on the land records in order to make the assignee's interest in rents
effective against third parties. Yet, while the law has traditionally characterized rents as realty, this characterization is in a significant sense only temporary. When rent becomes due and the tenant pays it, the "rent" typically takes
the form of cash (or a cash equivalent such as a check or funds on bank deposit) - which the law has always characterized as personal property.
The temporary nature of "rents" creates the possibility for priority conflicts between creditors whose interests arise under entirely different systems.
For example, suppose that Borrower has granted to Mortgage Bank a mortgage on Blueacre and an assignment of rents arising from it, but has also
granted Secured Party an effective Article 9 security interest in all of its assets. Both Mortgage Bank and Secured Party have taken all necessary steps to
make their respective interests effective against third parties. Borrower's tenant pays its monthly rent on Blueacre by check, but before the check is
cashed, Borrower defaults. Who has first priority in the check - Mortgage
Bank, by virtue of its assignment of rents, or Secured Party, by virtue of its
Article 9 security interest in the check?
Because the UARA preserves the traditional conception that "rent" is in
the nature of realty, 234 the UARA must provide priority rules to address the
potential conflicts between a rents assignee and another person claiming an
interest in the proceeds of rents by virtue of Article 9. To ensure the proper
coordination of the UARA with Article 9, the UARA provides as follows:

not know that its collection of the receivables would violate the rights of the senior
secured party. See id. § 9-332(a), (b).
232. UARA § 16 ("[UARA] does not preclude subordination by agreement as to
rents or proceeds.").
233. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
234. As discussed in Part II, several commentators have urged that Article 9
should treat rents as personal property collateral. Revised Article 9 decided to retain
the traditional exclusion of security interests in land and rents from land, and there
appears to be no impetus for further revision to Article 9. Thus, the UARA drafting
committee opted to leave the creation and enforcement of an assignment of rents to
the domain of real estate.
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* An assignee's perfected security interest in rents extends automatically to identifiableproceeds of the rents.235 The UARA defines

"proceeds" to mean any "personal property that is received or collected on account of a tenant's obligation to pay rents. ' 216 Thus, if an
assignor collects rents from tenants, an assignee that held a perfected
security interest in those rents will have a security interest in whatever personal property the assignor receives in payment of the rents.
- whether cash or noncash - so long as the proceeds are identifi-

able. 237 The assignee's interest in identifiable cash proceeds remains
perfected if its interest in the rents was properly perfected.2 38
* As a general matter, the UARA treats the assignee's interest in
proceeds of rents as if that interest had arisen under Article 9, and
then applies Article 9's priority rules.239 This general rule reflects

that once rents are transformed into personal property, the application of Article 9's priority rules is appropriate - at that point, third
parties would logically look to the Article 9 system to create, perfect, and enforce a security interest in property of that type. For example, suppose that Borrower has assigned its rents to Assignee.
Borrower thereafter collects rents from Tenant in cash, and uses
that cash to pay Supplier for office supplies. Under Article 9, a
transferee of money (such as Supplier) would take the money free
of a conflicting security interest unless the transferee had acted in
collusion with the transferor to violate the rights of the secured

235. UARA § 14(b)(2).

236. Id. § 2(10).
237. For determining whether commingled cash proceeds are "identifiable,"
UARA adopts the same standard used for identifiability of commingled cash proceeds
under U.C.C. § 9-315(b)(2). UARA § 14(c) (cash proceeds are identifiable "to the
extent the assignee can identify them by a method of tracing, including application of
equitable principles, that is permitted under law of this state other than [UARA] with
respect to commingled funds").
238. UARA § 15(b). Accord U.C.C. § 9-315(d)(2) (2005) (perfected security
interest in collateral extends continuously to identifiable cash proceeds). In the
unlikely event that a tenant paid its rent in the form of noncash proceeds, the assignee's security interest in the noncash proceeds would remain perfected only if the
assignee perfects that interest in accordance with Article 9. UARA § 15(b). Thus, for
example, if the tenant transferred a piece of equipment to the landlord in satisfaction
of its rental obligation, the assignee would have a security interest in the equipment as

identifiable proceeds of rents, Id. § 14(b)(2), but the assignee could perfect this interest only by filing a U.C.C.- 1 financing statement covering the equipment or by taking
possession of the equipment. Id. § 15(b).
239. UARA § 15(c) ("Except as otherwise provided in subsection (d), priority

between an assignee's security interest in identifiable proceeds and a conflicting interest is governed by the priority rules in Article 9.").
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party. 24° As the UARA incorporates this priority rule, Supplier
would take the cash free of Assignee's otherwise perfected security
interest in those funds, so long as Borrower and Supplier did not
act in collusion for the purpose of violating Assignee's rights. 24
9 An assignee'sperfected security interest in identifiablecash proceeds will have priority over a conflicting interest arising under
Article 9 if the Article 9 secured party perfected its interest by a
means other than control.242 In most circumstances, an Article 9

secured party will perfect its security interest in cash or cash
equivalents (such as funds in a deposit account) by means of control. In such cases, a secured party would take priority over the
conflicting interest of a rents assignee in the same funds under the
default rule set forth above. However, if the Article 9 secured
party's interest was perfected by a means other than control (e.g.,
by filing or automatic perfection), the UARA provides that the
rents assignee's perfected interest in the proceeds would take priority. For example, suppose that Borrower has assigned its rents to
Assignee. Borrower thereafter collects rents from Tenant by check,
and deposits the check into a deposit account maintained at Bank.
Secured Party has an enforceable security interest in all of Borrower's present and after-acquired assets, perfected by filing. If
Secured Party has established control over Borrower's deposit account at Bank, then Secured Party has priority over Assignee with
243
respect to the deposited funds. But if Secured Party has not established control over Borrower's deposit account, then Secured
Party's interest is perfected only by virtue of its initial filing (with
respect to the check) and automatic perfection (as to the cash proceeds of the check) - and Assignee would thus take priority with
244
respect to the proceeds of the check.
In light of these provisions, a prudent assignee of rents would presumably not only obtain and record an assignment of rents arising from the mortgaged premises, but might also require the assignor to deposit all rent funds
into a deposit account established specifically for that purpose (a "lockbox"),
and on which the assignee was identified as the bank's customer. These additional steps would be sufficient under Article 9 (and thus under the UARA) to
give the assignee priority over a conflicting Article 9 security interest claimed

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

U.C.C. § 9-332(a) (2001).
UARA § 15 cmt. 4, illus. 7.
Id. § 15(d).
Id. § 15 cmt. 4, illus. 3.
Id. § 15 cmt. 4, illus. 2.
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by another creditor (including the bank at which the deposit account is maintained).245
G. Enforcement of an Assignment of Rents and Mortgagee-inPossession Status
A mortgagee can enforce its interest in rents by taking physical possession of the mortgaged premises and thereby becoming a "mortgagee-inpossession." Most mortgagees are reluctant to do so, however, given the legal
responsibilities and the potential financial liabilities associated with that
status. A mortgagee that takes possession of the mortgaged premises becomes
liable in tort for injuries caused by the mortgagee's own conduct or by the
mortgagee's failure to carry out duties of care imposed upon the owner of
land.
In addition, a mortgagee in possession has an affirmative duty to
manage the premises in a "reasonably prudent and247careful" fashion for the
benefit of the mortgagor and junior encumbrancers.
As a result, most mortgagees prefer to enforce assignments of leases and rents through mechanisms
designed to establish "constructive" possession over the rents without assuming actual physical possession of the land. Most typically, mortgagees have
accomplished this by obtaining a receiver or notifying tenants to make rental
payments directly to the mortgagee/assignee.
The weight of case authority establishes that these steps (collecting rents
by means short of actual physical possession of the land) do not render the
mortgagee/assignee as a "mortgagee in possession" with the consequent liabilities attendant to that status. 248 California's statute also makes clear that
enforcement via appointment of a receiver, direct notification to tenants, or
direct notification to the mortgagor/assignor
does not, by itself, render the
249
mortgagee as a mortgagee-in-possession.
Consistent with this approach, the

245. U.C.C. § 9-327(4) (2001). By becoming the customer on the deposit account,
the assignee would obtain priority over a conflicting security interest claimed by the
bank holding the deposit account. Id. § 9-327(4) (security interest in deposit account
perfected by secured party's becoming customer on that account has priority over
conflicting security interest held by the bank with which that account is maintained).
Likewise, if that deposit account is also established specifically for the purpose of
collecting assigned rents, then it would be impossible for another creditor other than
the bank to obtain a conflicting security interest entitled to priority over the assignee.
Id. § 9-327(2) (security interests perfected by control rank in priority according to
time of obtaining control).
246. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 4.26, at 228.
247. See, e.g., ComFed Say. Bank v. Newtown Commons Plaza Assoc., 719 F.
Supp. 367, 375 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
248. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.2 cmt. c. (1997);
Prince v. Brown, 856 P.2d 589, 590 (Okla. Civ. App. 1993).
249. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 2938(e)(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 2005) (amended
1996).
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UARA provides that the mere enforcement of an assignment of rents by250one
of these methods does not render the assignee a mortgagee in possession.
H. Enforcement of an Assignment of Rents and the Impact of "OneAction" Rules
In California and several other states, existing legislation establishes the
"one-action" principle, under which a mortgagee is limited to one type of
action for the enforcement of the mortgage debt.251 The "one-action" principle serves to protect the mortgagor against potentially abusive enforcement
action, as it essentially forces the mortgagee to initiate its recovery effort
through foreclosure - thus permitting the mortgagee to recover any deficiency
claim only in the context of the foreclosure proceeding. 252 If the mortgagee
instead first brings an action to enforce the debt, courts have invoked the oneaction principle to conclude that the mortgagee has made an election of reme253
dies and has waived the ability to enforce its mortgage lien via foreclosure.
Typically, an assignee of rents enforces its interest in rents in the context
of a foreclosure. Accordingly, the mere enforcement of an assignment of
rents should not implicate the one-action principle so as to compromise the
assignee's other enforcement rights with respect to the mortgage debt. California's comprehensive assignment of rents statute clearly articulated this
view, providing that an assignee's collection of rents under the statute did not
"[c]onstitute an action, render the obligation unenforceable, violate Section
726 of the Code of Civil Procedure [the "one-action" rule] or, other than with
respect to marshaling requirements, otherwise limit any rights available to the
assignee with respect to its security." 254 Consistent with this approach, the
UARA likewise provides that an assignee's collection of rents does not violate the one-action principle, constitute an election of remedies that precludes

250. UARA § 11(1).
251. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 726(a) (West 1980); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
6-101 (2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 71-1-222 (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 40.430
(2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-37-1 (2002).

252. As Professors Nelson and Whitman explain:
The purpose of this rule is two-fold. One is to protect the mortgagor
against multiplicity of actions when the separate actions, though theoretically distinct, are so closely connected that normally they can and should
be decided in one suit. The other is to compel a creditor who has taken a
mortgage on land to exhaust the security before attempting to reach any
unmortgaged property to satisfy the claim.
NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 6, § 8.2, at 739.
253. See, e.g., Walker v. Cmty. Bank, 518 P.2d 329, 331 (Cal. 1984).
254. CAL. Civ. CODE § 2938(e)(2) (West 1993 & Supp. 2005) (amended 1996).
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later enforcement of the secured obligation, or bar the assignee from obtain2
ing a deficiency judgment following enforcement of the mortgage. 55
CONCLUSION
With the rapid expansion of securitization, it has become increasingly
clear that rents are functionally comparable to other forms of receivables.
While commercial law has long possessed a clear and uniform structure governing the creation, perfection, and enforcement of security interests in most
receivables (UCC Article 9), the law governing the creation, perfection, and
enforcement of security interests in rents has drifted without a comparable
statutory foundation. This lack of clarity has affirmatively promoted litigation
over control of rents, particularly in the bankruptcy context. Over the past 20
years, untold millions of dollars have been effectively wasted as mortgage
lenders, borrowers, and bankruptcy trustees have fought over control of rents
generated by mortgaged real estate.
Most of this waste could have been avoided if commercial law had
adopted comprehensive statutory rules governing security interests in rents.
The new UARA provides this much-needed statutory foundation. As explained in this Article and as summarized in the Appendix, the UARA provides a comprehensive set of rules governing the creation, perfection, and
enforcement of security interests in rents that are comparable to the corresponding Article 9 rules for personal property receivables. The UARA's
prompt enactment by state legislatures will bring long-overdue clarity to the
law of security in rents and further advance the cause of synthesis and coherence in the law of real and personal property finance.

255. UARA § 11(3)-(7). UARA also makes clear that an assignee's action against
the assignor for failure to turn over rents under UARA § 14(d) does not violate the
one-action principle or otherwise limit the assignee's rights with respect to enforcement of the secured obligation. Id.
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APPENDIX
The Uniform Assignment of Rents Act (UARA), promulgated by the

National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in July 2005,
provides a comprehensive framework to govern the creation, perfection, and
enforcement of security interests in rents arising from mortgaged real property. Without such a comprehensive statutory framework, courts (particularly
bankruptcy courts) have struggled to establish clear and consistent rules governing security interests in rents - thereby encouraging needless and wasteful
litigation over control of rents arising from mortgaged real property. Enactment of UARA in each state will provide much-needed clarity by establishing
the following rules:
a "Rents" include sums payablefor the right to possess or occupy
the realproperty of anotherperson, even if the occupant does not
technically constitute a "tenant" under realproperty law. In some
commercial real estate developments (such as hotels and marinas),
the occupants or "end-users" are not tenants under real property
law, because their occupancy agreement does not create a sufficiently "exclusive" or "possessory" right. For this reason, some
courts have refused to treat hotel room charges as "rents" and have
thus concluded that hotel room charges would not be covered by an
assignment of rents - even though such charges are functionally
analogous to rents and parties often executed an assignment of
rents believing that it covered such charges. UARA helps to resolve this documentary "trap," by providing that "rents" includes
any sums payable for the right to possess or occupy the real property of another person. UARA § 2(12).
e A mortgage automatically creates a security interest in rents.
Under the title theory of mortgages, a mortgage automatically effected an assignment of rents from the mortgaged real property.
Under the lien theory of mortgages, however, a mortgage did not
automatically create an assignment of rents. By contrast, under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, a security interest in collateral automatically extends to all identifiable proceeds of the collateral (including sums received from leasing collateral). Recognizing the functional similarity between "rents" and "proceeds,"
UARA provides that an effective mortgage automatically creates a
security interest in rents arising from the mortgaged real property,
unless the mortgage expressly provides otherwise. UARA § 4(a).
* A security interest in rents is perfected (and thus enforceable
against creditors and purchasers)upon recording of the document
creating an assignment of rents. Under Article 9, the filing of a fiHeinOnline -- 71 Mo. L. Rev. 65 2006
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nancing statement is sufficient to perfect a security interest in most
forms of personal property, By contrast, some courts have held that
even if a creditor held a recorded assignment of rents, the creditor
held only an "inchoate" lien until the creditor actually collected the
rents after default. Many of these courts further held that if the
debtor filed for bankruptcy before the creditor took effective steps
to collect the rent after default, the creditor's interest was unperfected and the bankruptcy trustee could set aside the creditor's interest in rents using the trustee's strong-arm power. UARA overrules these decisions, providing that the recording of a document
creating an assignment of rents is sufficient to perfect the creditor's
security interest in rents and thereby make that interest enforceable
against subsequent creditors and purchasers. UARA § 5(a)-(c).
* A security interest in rents is separate and distinct from a security interest in the underlying real property. The primary purpose
of an assignment of rents is to create an effective security interest
in rents that accrue after the assignor's default and prior to the assignee's completion of a foreclosure sale of the mortgaged real
property. Most courts have treated these rents as a source of collateral that is separate and distinct from the underlying land. A few
notorious bankruptcy court decisions, however, have held that
rents are "subsumed within the land" such that a debtor need not
provide adequate protection of the assignee's security interest in
rents. UARA would overrule these decisions (to the extent that
they rely upon state law), providing that a security interest in rents
is an additional source of collateral that is distinct from the underlying real estate. UARA § 4(b).
e There is no such thing as an "absolute assignment of rents" in
the context of a mortgage transaction; an assignment of rents creates only a security interest in the rents. Properly understood, an
assignment of rents creates only a security interest in rents as collateral for the mortgage debt. Courts in some states, however, have
held (and continue to hold) that an assignment of rents that purports to be an "absolute assignment" passes full title to the rents to
the assignee, even prior to the assignor's default. UARA would
overrule these decisions, providing that any assignment of rents
granted in the context of a mortgage transaction creates only a security interest in rents (regardless of its form). UARA § 4(b).
* In a mortgage or assignment of rents, a provision granting the
assignee the right to obtain a receiver following the assignor's default is enforceable. In many states, statutes provide few (if any)
standards to inform a court's exercise of discretion whether to appoint a receiver to collect rents from mortgaged real property.
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UARA establishes consistent standards to govern the appointment
of a receiver for mortgaged real property. UARA § 7(a). In particular, UARA establishes the enforceability of a clause by which the
assignor has agreed that the assignee can obtain the appointment of
a receiver after the assignor's default. UARA § 7(a)(1)(A).
* Upon default by the assignor(or as otherwise agreed by the assignor), the assignee may collect all rents that have accrued but
remain unpaid and all rents that accrue thereafter. UARA § 6(b).
By its terms, UARA does not allow the assignee to require the assignor to turn over sums already collected from its tenants prior to
enforcement by the assignee. However, an assignee could create,
perfect, and enforce a security interest in such monies under the
provisions of UCC Article 9.
e The assignee may enforce an assignment of rents by obtaining
the appointment of a receiver, by notification to the assignor, by
notification to the assignor'stenants, or by any other method permitted by other law. UARA provides specific rules governing the
collection of rents by receivership, by notification to the assignor,
and by notification to tenants. UARA also provides that an assignee could collect rents by any other method permitted by law
(including by becoming a mortgagee-in-possession). UARA §§
6(a), 7, 8, 9.
* The assignee's enforcement of its rights and remedies under
UARA does not render the assignee as a "mortgagee in possession" or triggerother adverse statutoryconsequences. At common
law, a creditor that collected rents after default risked a possible
argument that the creditor had become a "mortgagee in possession"
- thereby triggering fiduciary obligations to the assignor and potential tort liability to third parties. UARA provides that the assignee's mere exercise of UARA's statutory remedies does not render the assignee as a mortgagee in possession. UARA § 11 (1). Further, it does not constitute an election of remedies, render the
mortgage debt unenforceable, violate a state's "one-action" principle, or trigger the application of a state's anti-deficiency statute.
UARA § 11(2)-(7).
* An assignor that collects rents after it receives notification that
the assignee has enforced its security interest in rents must turn
over to the assignee the rents collected; if the assignorfails to do
so, it is liable to the assignee for the amount not turned over. At
common law, an assignor that refused to turn over rents to the assignee despite proper demand by the assignee could be held liable
for "waste" (or conversion) of rents. The amount of such liability,
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however, varied depending upon whether the jurisdiction followed
the lien theory of mortgages (damages recoverable only to the extent assignee's security was impaired) or the title theory of mortgages (damages measured by amount of rents collected and not
turned over). UARA provides that the assignor that fails to turn
over collected rents following a proper demand by the assignee is
liable to the assignee for all sums collected by the assignor. UARA
§ 14(b), (d). Any damages recovered by the assignee in an action
under § 14, however, constitute security for the mortgage debt and
must therefore be applied to the mortgage debt. UARA § 12.
* Most tenants that receive notification to make rent payments to
the assignee cannot thereafter discharge their rental obligation by
paying the assignor. Under the common law of contracts, the obligor can discharge its obligation by payment to the obligee until the
obligor receives notification that the obligee has assigned the right
to payment and the assignee directs the obligor to make payment to
the assignee. UARA primarily tracks existing common law, providing that a tenant that receives notification to pay the assignee
can only discharge its obligation by paying the assignee. UARA
9(c)(1)-(2). UARA does provide an exception for a tenant that occupies the premises as its primary residence, permitting such a tenant to satisfy its rental obligation by payment to either the assignee
or the assignor. UARA § 9(c)(2).
* An assignee that collects rents from the tenants or the assignor
can apply the collected sums to the mortgage debt and need not
apply the rents to the payment of expenses of maintaining the
mortgaged real property (unless otherwise agreed by the mortgagee). Tenants under commercial leases often pay sums called
"rent" or "additional rent" based upon the tenant's proportionate
share of real property taxes, insurance, and maintenance. An assignment of rents typically assigns the assignor's right to collect
these payments to the assignee as security for the mortgage debt.
Under prevailing law, an assignee that collects such rents can apply
them to the debt, without obligation to use those sums for the payment of property-related expenses (unless the assignee has so
agreed). UARA follows this prevailing view. UARA § 13(a).
UARA preserves any claims or defenses that a tenant may have by
virtue of the landlord's nonperformance of the lease, and also permits a tenant to seek appointment of a receiver if the assignee's
nonpayment of property-related expenses causes or threatens harm
to the tenant's interest in the mortgaged real property. UARA §
13(b), (c).
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* UARA establishespriority rules that govern disputes between interests created by real property law (a security interest in the cash
proceeds of rents) and interests in the same property createdunder

Article 9. A perfected security interest in rents extends to the identifiable proceeds of those rents - typically, cash collections. Because cash monies - and the deposit accounts in which cash is
typically maintained - are personal property in which a competing
security interest can be created under Article 9, UARA provides
coordinating priority rules to govern such priority disputes.
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